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Constitutional rules are norms whose application depends on an
interpreter's identification of a set of facts rather than on her exercise of
practical judgment. This Article argues that constitutional interpreters in
the United States tend to resolve ambiguity over constitutional rules by
reference to originalist sources and tend to resolve uncertainty over the
scope of constitutional standards by reference to nonoriginalist sources.
This positive claim unsettles the frequent assumption that the
Constitution's more specifw or structural provisions support straight-
forward interpretive inferences. Normatively, this Article offers a partial
defense of what it calls "rule originalism," grounded in the fact of its
positive practice, its relative capacity for restraining judges, and, above
all, its respect for the constitutional choice of rules versus standards.
Finally, this Article argues that this limited justification for rule
originalism suggests a liberalization of barriers to government institu-
tional standing in cases involving the meaning of constitutional rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional cases can be hard in more than one way.'
One kind of hard case addresses the contested meaning of a
constitutionally specified fact or set of facts, the presence or absence of
which triggers a governmental power, a governmental limitation, or an
individual entitlement. For example, Article II of the Constitution spe-
cifies that the President must be "a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution."2 The
presidential eligibility of someone born outside the country but made a
citizen at birth by statute depends on whether "natural born Citizen"
tracks jus soli principlesA Let us call this a case about the meaning of a
constitutional rule.
A second kind of hard case is about a difficult judgment an actor
must make as to whether a fact or set of facts reaches a constitutionally
specified threshold. The judgment triggers a governmental power, a
governmental limitation, or an individual entitlement, and the question
asks the adjudicator to reach the judgment herself or to evaluate the
1. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1975)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Hard Cases] (examining limits of rules and precedent in judicial
decisionmaking).
2. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
3. Compare Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of "Natural Born Citizen,"
128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 161, 161 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/on-the-
meaning-of-natural-born-citizen/ [http://perma.cc/A4PQ-SRGA] (relying on "British
common law and enactments of the First Congress" to assert that "the original meaning of the
phrase 'natural born Citizen' includes person, born abroad who are citizens from birth based
on the citizenship of a parent"), with Mary Brigid McManamon, Opinion, Ted Cruz Is Not
Eligible to Be President, Wash. Post (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/ted-cruz-is-not-eligible-to-be-president/2016/01/12/1484a7d0-b7af-1 Ie5-99f3-
184bc379bl2d~story.html [http://permacc/CW56-JRFS] ("[T]he law is clear: The framers of
the Constitution required the president of the United States to be born in the United States.").
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reasonableness of the judgment made by others. The exercise of judg-
ment is crucial in distinguishing this kind of question from the first kind.
Here, it can be expected that across the full range of factual scenarios,
different actors will reasonably reach different conclusions about
whether the threshold has been cleared. This divergence reflects the
nature of the question posed rather than anyone's error or irrationality.
Let us call this second type a case about the scope of a constitutional
standard.
This second category comprises the mine run of publicly salient
constitutional disputes. Do government restrictions on corporate
political spending in the run-up to an election abridge the freedom of
speech?4 Does a public university's race-based affirmative action policy
deny the equal protection of the laws to a rejected white applicant?5 Does
a state requirement that physicians have admitting privileges at a local
hospital before being legally permitted to perform an abortion deprive
pregnant women of their liberty without due process of law?6
This Article's animating claim is that the U.S. constitutional culture
privileges different modes of interpretation when addressing these
different kinds of constitutional questions. Judges, lawyers, and
constitutional scholars tend to answer questions about the meaning of a
constitutional rule with reference to the original understandings and
expectations of the Constitution's drafters and ratifiers. They tend to
answer questions about the scope of constitutional standards and
principles through various forms of living constitutionalism that account
for evolving social understanding, precedent, and prudential consid-
erations. In other words, Americans are originalist with respect to consti-
tutional rules but not with respect to constitutional standards: We are all
originalists sometimes.7
The notion that the conventionally appropriate mode of
interpretation varies with the structure of the constitutional question has
eluded most constitutional theorists. It is familiar learning that inter-
preters tend to apply more evolutionary methods to the more general
provisions of the Constitution and not necessarily to its more specific or
4. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (holding that restrictions on
corporate campaign spending abridge the freedom of speech).
5. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210-13 (2016) (affirming that the use
of race as a factor in admissions was not an equal protection violation); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-28 (2003) (holding that using race as a factor in law school
admissions did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
6. See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016) (holding
that the state law imposes an undue burden on women seeking abortions).
7. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:




technical provisions.' But accounts that emphasize this variation, often
marshaled in opposition to originalism, too often assume that specific or
technical provisions lend themselves to originalism because-and just to
the degree that-they fail to raise interesting interpretive problems.9 This
assumption is flawed. Not all constitutional questions concerning specific
provisions are "technical," and as noted, specific constitutional language
can nonetheless give rise to hard cases. The notion that questions about
relatively specific provisions tend toward originalism requires empirical
demonstration. The notion that such provisions should tend toward ori-
ginalism requires normative argumentation.
Some scholars have argued that originalism itself requires attention
to the degree to which the provision at issue is a rule, standard, or
principle, such that faithful originalism is compatible with, indeed
requires, evolving applications.1 ° It is difficult to understand the impulse
to label a wide range of different interpretive moves as "originalism"
except from the vantage of an ideological project," whether to buoy
originalism 2 or to emasculate it." Ideological projects have their place
within constitutional theory, but one casualty of this particular set of
8. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing constitutional claims that "derive from broad standards of
fairness" and those that derive "from very specific provisions of the Constitution" and
relying on historical meaning to define the second); Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The
Moral Reading of the American Constitution 7-8 (1996) (explaining that it is appropriate
to use the framers' perspectives to interpret the Third Amendment but not the
Fourteenth Amendment); David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What
It Says?, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 59 (2015) [hereinafter Strauss, Does the Constitution]
(arguing that "when a provision is specific it must be applied strictly according to its terms,
but provisions like the Commerce Clause... and the Equal Protection Clause enact
principles.., and their content can be filled in over time by courts and other
interpreters").
9. See, e.g., Lovett, 328 U.S. at 321;Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 42 (2011).
10. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 3 ("The method of text and principle requires fidelity
to the original meaning of the Constitution.... to the rules, standards, and principles
stated by the Constitution's text."); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as
a Law of Law, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 483, 503 (2014) (explaining the Constitution "makes
extensive use" of both rules and standards and that "[t]o discover the meaning of the
Constitution, one cannot start with a presumption in favor of one or the other kind of
formulation").
11. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "Ism," 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
301, 301-02 (1996) (arguing originalism is a "philosophical orientation that relates to
3ocial ordering" and is superior to alternative methods of interpretation),
12. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2349, 2352
(2015) (arguing originalism is the foundation of constitutional law and legal practices);
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 817,
820 (2014) [hereinafter Sachs, Originalism as a Theory] (identifying "a cler originalist
strain in our legal thought").
13. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 3-5 (describing how even originalist interpretation has
had to evolve); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Geo. L.J. 713,
714-15 (2011) (arguing originalism no longer has a claim to its initial purpose or the appeal
ofjudicial constraint, which it abandoned in order to gain theoretical defensibility).
1642 [Vol. 116:1639
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projects is a sober account of the place of original expected applications
in American constitutional law. Defenders of originalism have explained
away resort to original expectations as serving an evidentiary function-
where the real action is in the original public meaning of the
Constitution's text14-or else as simply a mistake.'5 But if one takes
practice seriously as the foundation of a positive rather than an
ideological project, then originalists' disparaged "ex"-original expect-
ations-recovers some of its luster.
If originalists tend to miss that different approaches interpreters
apply to different kinds of constitutional cases are indeed different,
pluralists tend to miss that those approaches vary systematically along the
dimension of case type. The most influential pluralist accounts assume
that (if and when it is time to fish or cut bait 6 ) an adjudicator's priorities
among interpretive approaches are driven by individual acts of
conscience,'7 by purely ideological or pragmatic considerations," or by
implicit reference to a conventional and transsubstantive hierarchy of
approaches. 9 The canonical literature lacks an account of when rather
than whether Americans are originalist, structuralist, doctrinalist, and so
forth. This Article provides a piece of that missing account.
Part I clears some definitional underbrush, situating this Article's
understanding of rules and standards within the rich constitutional
theory and jurisprudential literature on the topic. Canonical accounts of
the rule-standard-or more often, rule-principle 20-distinction tend to
14. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2003) (advocating for the
use of the Constitution's nonpublic history as a way of ascertaining the document's
original meaning).
15. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48
Stan. L. Rev. 155, 161 n.37 (1995) ("There are very serious reasons to question whether
any weight at all should be given ... to Madison's secret legislative history from
Philadelphia.").
16. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1193 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Constructive
Coherence Theory] (arguing that interpreters do not typically face this dilemma because
they construe various approaches to point in the same direction).
17. See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 155-62 (1991) (arguing an
adjudicator choosing among modes of solving a constitutional question cannot default to
an overarching rule to guide the decisionmaking).
18. See generally Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Law 1-17 (1988) (critiquing the use of grand theories in judicial
interpretation).
19. See Fallon, Constructive Coherence Theory, supra note 16, at 1243-46
(identifying implicit rankings at play in constitutional interpretation; in order from most
to least persuasive: arguments from text, arguments of historical intent, arguments of
theory, arguments from precedent, and arguments of value).
20. See infra note 57 (explaining the overlap between standards and principles for
the purposes of this Article's discussion).
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emphasize, variously, that rules are dispositive and principles not2' or that
rules are specific and principles not.22 What unifies these accounts is the
degree of practical judgment one can anticipate in applying a norm to a
set of facts. Rules mean to foreclose such judgment, whereas standards or
principles mean to invite it.
Part II argues that U.S. judges are implicitly sensitive to this
distinction in constitutional cases. The distinction motivates their
interpretive instincts, and those same instincts shape their assessments of
which provisions are rules and which are standards. In cases in which
judges perceive rules, their instincts are originalist. In cases in which they
perceive standards, their instincts are not. Likewise, one can observe a
substantial degree of reflexivity in the relationship between different
constitutional norms and their corresponding interpretive strategies.
Dynamic interpretation exerts pressure on a judge's understanding of a
norm as a rule or a standard. These judgments are mutually constructed.
Part III offers a qualified defense of the positive practice Part II
describes. Originalism is often defended on institutional or democratic
grounds. It is said to provide disciplining criteria for judicial judgment 23
and to do so in the name of a constituent power.24 Some scholars have
defended originalism in rule-consequentialist terms, arguing that the
practice of originalism makes attractive policy outcomes more likely.25
This Article defends rule originalism on three alternative grounds: on
the basis of its consistency with positive practice; as potentially
redemptive of originalism's erstwhile promise of judicial restraint (an
echo to the institutional ground described above); and, importantly, in
what one may call functionalist terms.
This last justification is teleological rather than consequentialist or
deontological. It does not assume that good outcomes will result from
rule originalism, nor does it assume that democratic commitments
obligate judges toward originalism. Indeed, while Part III represents a
normative intervention, it should not be understood as prescriptive. It
offers prima facie reasons for a practice on the basis of the values the
practice promotes but does not instruct adjudicators on how to proceed
21. See, e.g., Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights 57 (Julian Rivers trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1986); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 14, 25 (1967) [hereinafter Dworkin, The Model of Rules].
22. Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 Yale L.J. 823, 838 (1972).
23. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism
and Originalism?, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2415 (2006) (book review).
24. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 703, 715-19 (2009).
25. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of
Liberty 5 (rev. ed. 2014) [hereinafter Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution] (arguing
originalism enables constitutional interpretation that enhances individual liberty); John
0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution 11 (2013)
(arguing originalist interpretation of the Constitution will promote human welfare).
1644 [Vol. 116:1639
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in any given case or set of cases. The set of considerations that should
properly influence adjudicative outcomes in constitutional cases, and the
relative weights that should attach to those considerations, implicate the
role morality ofjudges, a topic beyond the scope of this Article.
The basic claim is that originalism respects the structure of and
purpose behind constitutional rules. Rules determine the application of
law to fact prospectively rather than in the moment. They are primarily
devices for settlement and coordination among governmental actors and
between government and the people rather than heuristics for further-
ing constitutional purposes. As such, subsequent practices and under-
standings have limited epistemic value in understanding a rule's content
and requirements. Such practices might well have pragmatic or
prudential value for an adjudicator determining whether a rule should
apply, and so arguments drawing on evolving understandings are best
marshaled in favor of limitations on rules rather than as reasons for
reinterpreting them.
Significantly, this argument in defense of rule originalism is not
originalist all the way down. If the best justification for rule originalism is
its fitness for securing the settlement and coordination benefits of
constitutional rules, then it follows that judges should not depart from
the settled meaning of a rule except for pragmatic or prudential reasons.
That is, this Article's partial defense of rule originalism is strongest in
cases of first impression. It does not necessarily support originalism as a
vehicle for changing a rule's settled understanding.
Part IV discusses the potential implications of this defense of rule
originalism for certain standing questions. Rule originalism is less useful
when practice has completely or partially settled a rule's application. 26
But settlement through practice takes time and can therefore undermine
the coordination benefits of constitutional rules. Settlement through
practice also tends to privilege the executive in the separation of powers
struggles that rules are often designed to forestall. 27 When such conflicts
are not political questions, federal courts should consider relaxing
standing requirements in order to adjudicate rules questions sooner
rather than later.
This suggestion intervenes in a debate over legislative standing that
recently divided the Court in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission.28 There, Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, argued in dissent that Article III's case or controversy
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) ("[I]n interpreting
the [Recess Appointments] Clause, we put significant weight upon historical practice."
(emphasis omitted)).
27. For a discussion of the pro-executive bias likely to result from settlement of
separation of powers disputes through historical practice, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor
W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 440-47
(2012).
28. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
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provision does not and should not extend to separation of powers
disputes brought by governmental institutions.29 This Article disagrees.
While it is important to apply the political question doctrine, when
applicable, to separation of powers conflicts, limiting standing can be
quite damaging insofar as it delays but does not preclude jurisdiction. It
is precisely the Court's originalists who should agree most. 0
I. THEJURISPRUDENCE OF RULES
The literature on the relationship between rules, standards, and
principles in constitutional law and theory is voluminous and sophis-
ticated. This Part clarifies this Article's point of entry into those debates.
A. A Working Definition
I define constitutional rules in terms of the expectations the
constitutional community brings to interpretive questions: When those
questions arise from the meaning of constitutional language that does
not appear to anticipate the exercise of judgment as to its scope, a
constitutional rule is at issue. For example, Article I of the Constitution
provides as follows:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him,
the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it,
unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in
which Case it shall not be a Law."
The meaning of this provision, which permits what is known as a "pocket
veto," seems to be reasonably well specified by its text, and anyone would
assume that it was designed to be well specified. But in 1929, the Court
had to decide whether the "adjournment" to which the clause refers is
only the final adjournment ending a Congress or instead includes an
interim adjournment between the first and second sessions. 32 This is a
question about the meaning of a constitutional rule.
Likewise, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Supreme Court had to
determine the meaning of the Article II phrase "the Recess of the
Senate."3 3 The President has greater authority to make appointments if
the phrase refers to an adjournment for any period than if it refers only
29. See id. at 2694 (ScaliaJ., dissenting,joined by Thomas, J.).
30. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 861
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil] (noting that, with the passage of
time, originalism can be "too bitter a pill").
31. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
32. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 680 (1929).
33. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3).
1646 [Vol. 116:1639
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to an adjournment sine die.34 Noel Canning is also a case about the
meaning of a constitutional rule.
By contrast, provisions empowering Congress to "regulate,"3 5 requir-
ing that persons be accorded "equal" treatment, 6 or requiring that states
not deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without "due process of
law"3 7 do not seem to contemplate that the full scope of application is
known at the time of drafting. These provisions are best understood as
raising questions about constitutional standards.
The denomination of questions as implicating constitutional rules
versus constitutional standards is not necessarily a function of the
constitutional text. Interpreters might believe there are rules of consti-
tutional dimension that the text does not memorialize."' Some examples
might include the rule that the President's removal power is exclusive of
Congress,3 9 that states may not impose their own qualifications on
congressional candidates,4" or that Congress may not abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers.4
The presence of these atextual cases underscores the important
point that this Article's distinction between rules and standards does not
track the "interpretation-construction distinction" that has come to be
associated with "New Originalists."'42 Professor Lawrence Solum and
others have distinguished constitutional "interpretation"-"the activity
that aims at discovery of the linguistic meaning of the various articles and
amendments that form the United States Constitution"-from constitu-
tional "construction"-which "gives legal effect to the semantic content
of [the Constitution's] text."4 3 Identifying either a constitutional rule or
standard need not entail identifying the linguistic meaning of a text, and
judges "in the wild" do not typically draw even an implicit distinction
between linguistic and legal meanings in the mine run of cases.
34. See id. at 2562. An adjournment sine die is one that does not specify a date for
the legislature to return. See id. at 2560-61.
35. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 5.
36. Id. amend. XLV, § 1.
37. Id.
38. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813,
1820 (2012) (posing the question, "[W]hether even if the text is the exclusive source of
constitutional law, some legal rules external to the Constitution... are nonetheless
protected from repeal").
39. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (invalidating a law denying
the President unrestricted power of removal of first-class postmasters).
40. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).
41. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
42. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27
Const. Comment. 95,100 (2010).
43. Id. at 101, 103; see also Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note 25, at
118-22; Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original
Intent, andJudicial Review 5-7 (1999).
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This Article's definition of constitutional rules and standards does
not derive from any particular philosophical account; it is generated by
and answers only to constitutional practice. That being said, identifying
and examining the leading accounts helps to clarify the Article's claim
and enables the argument to benefit from some of the rich thinking
those accounts have generated.
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks give us a canonical account
of the distinction between rules and standards in law." In their
magisterial The Legal Process, they defined a rule as "a legal direction
which requires for its application nothing more than a determination of
the happening or non-happening of physical or mental events-that is,
determinations of fact."45 A standard, by contrast, is "a legal direction
which can be applied only by making, in addition to a finding of what
happened or is happening in the particular situation, a qualitative
appraisal of those happenings in terms of their probable consequences,
moral justifications, or other aspect of general human experience."'
These definitions are consistent with this Article's, though with a
caveat. As Part II elaborates, rules and standards are necessarily
normative categories in constitutional law. Denominating a norm as one
or the other depends on other, perhaps subconscious, judgments about
constitutional interpretation and the outcomes that interpretation is
thought to support. For that reason, this Article describes rules and
standards in terms of the understandings the interpreter brings to the
adjudicative project rather than in terms of any inherent features of the
Constitution's text. Rules are norms the interpreter understands in
essentially factual terms that require no "qualitative appraisal."47
44. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law 139-41 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., Found. Press 1994) (1958).
45. Id. at 139.
46. Id. at 140.
47. ProfessorJack Balkin has described the difference between rules and standards in
terms similar to mine. For him, "[r]ules are distinguished from standards by how much
practical or evaluative judgment they require to apply them to concrete situations." Balkin,
supra note 9, at 349 n.12. Balkin further argues that both rules and standards are distinct
from principles inasmuch as they "are normally conclusive in deciding a legal question,
although decisionmakers can make exceptions later on." Id. By contrast, principles "are
norms that, when relevant, are not conclusive but must be considered in reaching a
decision." Id.
This Article breaks with Balkin's distinction between standards and principles only
marginally, but I do not share his view that positive constitutional norms such as freedom
of speech and equal protection of the laws are best described as principles rather than
standards. See id. While it is true that both the freedom of speech and equal protection
guarantees in the Constitution are subject to limitation when justiciable, within U.S. con-
stitutional culture it is more accurate to describe these limitations as defining the scope of
the right rather than defining the circumstances under which the right is "outweighed."
Cf. DarylJ. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
857, 937 (1999) (arguing that constitutional rights are neither conceptually separate from
1648 [Vol. 116:1639
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B. Rules and Standards in Constitutional Law
The rules-standards distinction has been a subject of constitutional
law talk for years. In her 1991 Harvard Law Review foreword, Professor
Kathleen Sullivan distinguished what she called a 'Justice of rules" from
a "Justice of standards."48 Sullivan was describing a longstanding debate
between those who believe the best way for the Court to adjudicate
constitutional cases is to articulate, respectively, rule-like or standard-like
decisional norms.
49
This Article is not about that debate. Whether the Court should
articulate decisions in rule-like or standard-like terms is interesting and
important, but it does not relate directly to how adjudicators understand
the structure of the constitutional question they are being asked. Thus,
to use one of Sullivan's examples, Justice Scalia's majority decision in
Employment Division v. Smith, holding that religious accommodation
claims are generally unavailable with respect to neutral laws of general
applicability,5" is rule-like insofar as it specifies a set of criteria that, once
identified, are essentially decisive of the constitutional controversy. The
rule-like nature of the opinion is motivated by a desire to promote
transparency and predictability, two of the values generally believed to
follow from the application of rules as defined by Sullivan. 51 Concurring
in the judgment, Justice O'Connor preferred a standard-like approach
that contemplated judicial balancing in every instance in which a court
was faced with a substantial burden on religious practice, regardless of
the motivation behind the law.52
Even though Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor disagreed about
whether the Court should adjudicate free exercise cases through rules or
standards, both of their views are consistent with understanding the Free
Exercise Clause as a constitutional standard as this Article defines the
term: Disagreement about the range of laws that qualify as prohibitions
on the free exercise of religion is inherent rather than aberrational.
Indeed, the discretion that a constitutional standard invites is why Justice
Scalia thought it important to constrain adjudicators via a rule-like
nor normatively privileged over constitutional remedies). The constitutional norms that
really do meet Balkin's (and my) definition of principles include, among others, norms
guaranteeing the separation of powers and federalism, as well as the nonjusticiable norms
that appear in the Preamble. See U.S. Const. pmbl.
48. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: TheJustices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L.
Rev. 22, 121 (1992).
49. See id. at 57-59; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179-80 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law as Law of Rules]
(defending an apex constitutional court's use of rules rather than balancing tests).
50. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
51. See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 384-89 (1985)
(outlining popular arguments for rules and standards); Sullivan, supra note 48, at 58.
52. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-95 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in the judgment).
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doctrinal formulation. 53 His view about the nature of judicial decision
rules follows from a normative perspective on judicial discretion, not
from the epistemic structure of the Free Exercise Clause or the kinds of
questions it raises. Consistent with this observation, and despite Justice
Scalia's authorship of the majority opinion, the Smith case contained no
originalist argumentation or briefing.54
C. Rules and Standards in Jurisprudence
There is another long-running debate over rules that is more
proximate to, though also distinct from, this Article's themes. This is the
supraconstitutional debate over the nature of legal rules, especially in
relation to legal principles. While the literature on constitutional
decision rules sits within constitutional law and theory, the debate over
the nature of legal rules and principles falls within the rubric of analytic
jurisprudence. This discourse begins with Professor Ronald Dworkin's
critique of legal positivism55 and in recent years has centered on
Professor Robert Alexy's articulation of principles as "optimization
requirements" that are categorically distinct from rules.56 This Article's
use of the term "rule" does not have the technical significance that
Dworkin, Alexy, or their critics assign to it, as the project is not juris-
prudential in nature. It will nonetheless be fruitful to mine this debate
for insights that are helpful to the positive legal analysis that follows.57
53. See Scalia, Rule of Law as Law of Rules, supra note 49, at 1179-80.
54. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872; see also Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and
the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 259, 260 (noting the lack of
originalist interpretation in the Court's opinion).
55. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 21, at 17-22.
56. See Alexy, supra note 21, at 47-54 ("Principles are optimization requirements,
characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied to varying degrees, and that the
appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on what is factually possible but also
on what is legally possible.").
57. An expositional point is in order. This section generally speaks of "principles"
rather than "standards" despite some terminological discomfort in doing so. The
jurisprudence literature has tended to focus on the rule-principle distinction, without
preserving a special space for standards. See, e.g., id. at 57. This tendency likely derives
from the nature of the questions of interest to scholars of analytic jurisprudence. When
Dworkin announced his definitions of rules and principles, he assumed that this
distinction was relevant (or rather, was thought by others to be relevant) to exploring the
nature of a legal system. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 21, at 22-24.
Insofar as principles contemplate wide adjudicative discretion or are not legally dispositive
even when valid, they pose a challenge to someone wishing to understand them as law. Id.
By contrast, this Article concerns not the nature of law but rather the practice of U.S.
constitutional interpretation, an exercise whose foundational assumptions include both
the legality and the justiciability of the Constitution's abstract clauses. For that reason, it
may be clearer to describe those clauses as "standards," which more strongly implies that
they represent justiciable and authoritative legal norms. Still, because the jurisprudential
literature tends to use the term "principles," this Article does so as well when drawing on
that literature. Since the Article's primary interest is in rules, developing a further
distinction between standards and principles is not worth the candle here. See id. at 31.
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Scholars who have explored the distinction between rules and
principles tend to distinguish them along one of two dimensions: what
one might call the dimensions of finality and specificity. For some
scholars, most prominently Dworkin and Alexy, the distinction between
rules and principles is that rules are either dispositive or invalid,5"
whereas principles are defeasible considerations that may remain valid
even if they do not prevail in a given case. 59 For instance, to use an
example Dworkin relies on, Justice Black argued that the First
Amendment is absolute, such that once one is understood to have a free
speech right (for example) that right may not be balanced away.60 On
Dworkin's and Alexy's views, Justice Black believed the First Amendment
stated a rule: Once it was determined that a case engaged the amend-
ment, that determination settled the case. 61 On this view, the difference
between rules and principles is a difference in kind rather than a differ-
ence in degree.
62
Professor Joseph Raz challenges this definition of rules. For him,
rules and principles differ along the dimension of specificity rather than
finality.6" Rules prescribe relatively specific acts whereas principles
prescribe relatively unspecific acts.64 Thus, a ban on smoking is a rule,
since the kinds of acts it bans fall within a narrow range. By contrast, a
requirement to pursue happiness is a principle, since the range of acts it
regulates is quite broad.6 5 On this view of the rule-principle distinction,
Justice Black's belief that the First Amendment is not susceptible to
balancing bears no necessary relation to its status as a rule or a principle.
Principles may be dispositive just as rules may be, but because principles
58. See Alexy, supra note 21, at 57 ("In that rules insist that one does exactly as
required, they contain a decision about what is to happen within the realm of the legally
and factually possible."); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 24 (1977) ("If the facts
a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies
must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.").
59. See Alexy, supra note 21, at 57 ("It does not follow from the fact that a principle
is relevant to a case that what the principle requires actually applies. Principles represent
reasons which can be displaced by other reasons."); Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra
note 21, at 26 ("All that is meant, when we say that a particular principle is a principle of
our law, is that the principle is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant,
as a consideration inclining in one direction or another.").
60. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865, 874-75 (1960).
61. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 21, at 27-28 (summarizing the
argument that the First Amendment is "an absolute").
62. See Alexy, supra note 21, at 57-59; Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 21,
at 24-25. Dworkin and Alexy do not understand rules and principles in identical terms.
For example, Alexy denies that an exception to a rule in a particular case or even in many
cases defeats the definitive character of a rule. See Alexy, supra note 21, at 57-58.





prescribe less specific acts, they "tend to be more vague and less certain
than rules. 6 6 The difference is in degree, not in kind.
67
This conceptual vocabulary can help us to understand what is dis-
tinctive about what this Article calls constitutional rules. A constitutional
rule is a constitutional norm whose scope of application is not expected to
be subject to reasonable disagreement. A constitutional standard is a
constitutional norm whose scope of application is inherently unclear at
the margins, such that reasonable disagreement is anticipated (and
indeed does some work in fixing the content of the norm). As a
shorthand, conflicts over constitutional rules result either from
ambiguity or from failure of will in applying them, while conflicts over
constitutional standards result from vagueness.6
8
This feature of constitutional rules and standards is common to both
the "finality" and the "specificity" views of legal rules. If one believes that
rules are uniquely dispositive, then it should be the case that once one
knows what a rule requires, one must either apply the rule or depart
from it. For a principle, understanding what it requires does not tell us
how to apply it, for it must be weighed against other relevant principles.
As Alexy writes, "Principles lack the resources to determine their own
extent in the light of competing principles and what is factually
possible."6 9 On this view, then, the use of a principle anticipates-in a
constitutive sense-that there may be disagreement as to how the
principle is to be applied in any given instance of conflict.
If one instead adopts the view that rules are relatively specific and
principles not, then one can still, again, expect application of principles
to anticipate reasonable disagreement as to scope. It is true that Raz
views this difference as one of degree; since a prescription may always be
stated in more specific terms, one might also anticipate some
disagreement as to the scope of rule application." Even if "no smoking"
is a rule, adjudicators might disagree over its application to electronic
cigarettes, which do not burn tobacco.7" Still, this judgment is of a
different sort than the judgment that characterizes adjudication of
constitutional standards. The application of a ban on electronic ciga-
rettes is unclear because of an unanticipated technology. Had the drafter
66. Id. at 841.
67. Id. at 838.
68. Solum has emphasized the importance of the distinction between ambiguity and
vagueness to constitutional adjudication. See Solum, supra note 42, at 97-98. An ambigu-
ous phrase "has more than one sense," whereas a vague expression has many "borderline
cases." Id.; see also Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note 25, at 121.
69. Alexy, supra note 21, at 57.
70. See Raz, supra note 22, at 838.
71. "No vehicles in the park," the most famous hypothetical legal norm, is a rule in
this sense. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 593, 607 (1958). The example is effective precisely because the rule's content is
intended to be straightforward and appears so at a glance.
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been aware of electronic cigarettes, she presumably would have drafted
more carefully; at the least, one can construct a rule-principle distinction
in which a norm represents a rule to the degree that the presence of
unanticipated cases prompts a reevaluation of the norm's content.
Thus, one can draw a categorical distinction between rules and
principles even if specificity is the dimension of difference. It is a
categorical distinction not in respect to the inherent structure of
particular norms or verbal formulations but rather in respect to the
expectations the adjudicator brings to her task. As this Article defines
them, constitutional rules are understood by adjudicators as norms
designed to eliminate their discretion in applying the norm to particular
cases, whether or not that elimination is successful in practice.
Let us pause to consider the word "discretion," which is ambiguous
in this context. As Dworkin notes, there are at least three forms of
adjudicative discretion.72 In what Dworkin calls its weak form, discretion
means that "the standards an official must apply cannot be applied
mechanically but demand the use of judgment."73 In what he calls
another weak form, discretion means that "some official has final
authority to make a decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed by any
other official. '74 In its strong form, discretion means the official "is
simply not bound by standards set by the authority in question. '75 At a
minimum, constitutional rules aim to eliminate discretion both in its first
weak form and in the strong form.
Dworkin believes that the first weak form of discretion is not
interesting. 76 No serious legal professional or scholar believes that legal
rules obviate the need for the exercise of judgment.77 Either rules or
principles may lead to hard cases. But in adjudicating principles, hard
cases are fully expected; with rules, they are surprising. A hard case might
arise because of ambiguity as to what the rule means to prescribe. To
return to the First Amendment example, when the Constitution says
"Congress shall make no law,"78 one may wonder what is meant by
Congress (Does the Confederation Congress count?), or perhaps what is
meant by "law" (Are regulations laws?). One may also wonder whether
the rule is absolute or instead has exceptions (What about hate
speech?79 ). Finally, a hard First Amendment case might result from
72. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 21, at 32-33.
73. Id. at 32.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 33.
76. Id. at 35.
77. See id. ("The proposition that when no clear rule is available discretion in the
sense ofjudgment must be used is a tautology.").
78. U.S. Const. amend. I.
79. See, e.g., R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-92 (1992) (striking down a
city ordinance that prohibited certain forms of symbolic hate speech).
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uncertainty as to which kinds of laws qualify as abridgements of the
freedom of speech (What about a time, place, or manner restriction?0 ).
To put it another way, the Constitution might attempt to fix the
application of one of its prescriptions but fail in that attempt. That
failure generates a question about a constitutional rule. Alternatively, the
Constitution might attempt to leave open the application of its
prescriptions and succeed in that attempt. That success generates a
question about a constitutional standard. As the next Part describes,
American constitutional lawyers treat these kinds of questions differently,
and with good reason.
II. THE POSITIVE CASE
The foundational claim of this Article, which this Part elaborates, is
that the U.S. constitutional culture tends to rely on originalist methods
in resolving questions about constitutional rules and tends to use non-
originalist methods in resolving questions about constitutional standards.
Substantiating that claim requires one to define the constitutional cul-
ture and specify a methodology for identifying its practices.
The constitutional culture is a diverse community of lawyers, judges,
scholars, public officials, and law-curious others. The community is so
diverse, in fact, that it is difficult to identify a consensus as to its practices
except at a high level of generality: Original understandings matter,
precedent is relevant, Brown v. Board of Education8 ' (whatever it means 2 )
is correct, and so forth. Achieving greater specificity than this usually
requires a narrowing of the community, often in ways not obvious to the
narrower. Methodologically, the best measure of any particular account
starts, as this Article does, with the law sense of a scholar who is part of
the community and familiar with its norms. That law sense is then tested
through the crucible of peer evaluation and subsequent influence. If the
account resonates with other members of the community, then it is likely
an accurate one.
In developing an account of rule originalism, this Part draws from
the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court's reasoning and
opinion-writing practices do not exhaust the constitutional culture.
There are other courts, of course, and there are forms of constitutional
discourse that do not resemble adjudication. Still, the practices of the
80. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784-90 (1989) (upholding a
New York City noise-control ordinance).
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
746-47 (2007) (outlining a discussion of whether Brown's heritage is a prohibition of
.government classification and separation on grounds of race" or the requirement of
admitting students to public schools on a "nonracial basis"); Brad Snyder, How the
Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 383, 390-91
(2000) (questioning how Brown gained its hallowed place in U.S. constitutional law).
1654 [Vol. 116:1639
RULE ORIGINALISM
Court are certainly an important part of the constitutional culture of the
United States. Identifying a trend within those practices places a heavy
burden on anyone who would argue against the trend's significance with-
in that culture.8 3
The measure of any positive account of constitutional practices is
not whether it covers all cases without exception. Rather, the measure is
whether it supplies the best account, the one that most accurately fits the
available data. That is, it takes a positive theory to beat a positive theory,
bearing in mind that ad hoc pluralism is itself a positive theory a scholar
may wish to invoke and defend. This observation is a version of what
Professor William Baude has called "the bear principle," based on the
old joke about needing only to outrun one's friend when confronting an
approaching bear in the woods.84 The principle applies as much to
positive theories as to normative ones.
This Part begins, in section II.A, with the aspect of the account that
is easiest to substantiate: The Court tends to use dynamic forms of
interpretation when confronted with questions about constitutional
standards. Section II.B argues that, by contrast, the Court tends to use
originalism when addressing questions about constitutional rules.
Section II.C discusses and rejects alternative positive accounts, namely
those that declare instances of originalism to be rare, to be ubiquitous, or
to be unpredictable.
A. Standard Nonoriginalism
Originalism has been used to describe a wide variety of interpretive
practices.8 5 For reasons made clear below, this Article uses the term to
describe the view that the Constitution should be interpreted by refer-
ence to the understandings and expectations of its drafters or ratifiers.
U.S. constitutional practice is not generally originalist in this relatively
narrow sense. Nonoriginalist Supreme Court opinions are common and
expected. Nearly all of the Court's most canonical rights decisions, from
Brown to Griswold v. Connecticut"' to Roe v. Wade, 7 ignore or trivialize
original expectations, and the original meaning or scope of the relevant
provisions are not significant subjects of the Court's analysis in its most
publicly salient constitutional-issue areas, including abortion,88 affir-
83. See Baude, supra note 12, at 2370 ("[T]he Supreme Court's practice is a readily
available source of evidence of official attitudes, it is often thought to be inconsistent with
originalism, and it is an important place to start.").
84. See id. at 2407.
85. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 NYU. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2009)
("Originalism comes in many flavors; varied distinct theses are fairly described as
'originalist' in tighter or looser senses.").
86. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
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mative action,89 the Commerce Clause, 90 capital punishment, 91 and the
First Amendment.9 2 Indeed, the originalism movement that emerged in
the 1980s was an explicit response to the absence of originalist analysis in
the Court's case law.
93
The history of originalism did not, of course, end in the 1980s, and
it is fair to ask what, if anything, might have changed since then. Some of
the Court's recent majority opinions have been conspicuously originalist,
relying on its view of original meanings or understandings to contravene
existing precedent. Most famously, the Court held in District of Columbia
v. Heller9 4 that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
bear arms even though the Court had historically tied the Amendment
solely to militia service.95 Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Heller was
self-consciously originalist, and notably, even Justice Stevens's dissenting
argument leaned heavily on his assessment of founding-era expecta-
89. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003); Jamal Greene, Fourteenth
Amendment Originalism, 71 Md. L. Rev. 978, 988-89 (2012) [hereinafter Greene,
Fourteenth Amendment] (noting Justices Scalia and Thomas do not critique affirmative
action in originalist terms); see also Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 Va. L. Rev. 753, 753 (1985) ("With one
exception, this entire body of case law is devoid of any reference to the original intent of
the framers of the fourteenth amendment.").
90. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas,J., concurring).
91. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 469 (2008) (Alito,J., dissenting); Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94 (2008) (Thomas,J., concurring in thejudgment).
92. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of
the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1085, 1085 (1995) (arguing "the Court
has generally ... dismissed the issue of historical intent" when interpreting the
Establishment Clause as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Brown v.
Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 546 U.S. 786, 821 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First
Amendment."); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 425-32 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in
Early American History 1 (1960) (arguing against the "proposition... conventionally
accepted in both law and history that the Framers of the First Amendment had a very
broad understanding of freedom of speech and press"); Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409,
1413 (1990).
93. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law 6-7 (1990) ("The orthodoxy of original understanding... [is] anathema to a liberal
culture that for fifty years has won a succession of political victories from the courts ... .");
Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 464-66 (1986) (arguing for "a jurisprudence of
original intention"); see also James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution 17
(2015) (noting "canonical originalists" like Justice Scalia and Judge Bork "spent their
whole careers railing against" cases with little or no originalist analysis).
94. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding the Second
Amendment does not protect the right to keep and bear arms that have no "reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia").
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tions.9 6 Likewise, the Court has taken an identifiably originalist turn in a
series of criminal procedure cases involving Sixth Amendment rights to a
jury trial and to confrontation of witnesses.9 7
These cases are the exceptions that prove the rule. They are
noteworthy precisely because originalism does not represent the Court's
usual mode of analysis. The best explanation for the originalism of the
Sixth Amendment cases is that Justice Scalia's jurisprudential commit-
ments to originalism and to discretion-limiting devices-whether in rules
or standards cases-led him to be more favorable to defendants in some
criminal procedure contexts.98 Since he was a "crossover" vote in such
cases, the majority was disproportionately likely to cater to his preferred
approach.
Heller might be a different story. The language of constitutional rules
and standards adds insight both to the originalist majority opinion and to
Justice Stevens's curiously originalist dissent in Heller. The Second
Amendment's proscription on "infringe [ments]" upon the right to bear
arms is a classic constitutional standard, but the threshold disagreement
in Heller was not over what counts as an infringement. Rather, it was
about the circumstances under which the right is activated.9 This is a
subtle distinction, irrelevant in most cases, but conspicuous in Heller. The
dissent's position was that, whatever kinds of constraints the right to bear
arms imposes, the right is not triggered except in the context of militia
regulation. 100 Whether the Second Amendment applies only to militia
service or instead to infringements on civilian possession and use is a cat-
egorical inquiry; it is a question about a rule, not a standard. As section
II.B elaborates below, originalism is unremarkable in this context.
Recently, several scholars have argued or implied that the Court's
approach in cases that this Article has described as implicating constitut-
ional standards is best described as originalist. In separate articles,
Professors Stephen Sachs and Baude have argued that courts that rely
heavily on precedent and evolving interpretation in adjudicating consti-
tutional cases may be acting consistently with originalism. For Sachs,
originalism is best understood as a theory of legal change rather than, for
96. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 640, 652-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining "why [the
Court's] decision in Miller was faithful to the text of the Second Amendment and the
purposes revealed in its drafting history").
97. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-61 (2004) (noting a shift toward a
more originalist understanding of the Confrontation Clause); Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530
U.S. 466, 518 (2000) ("Today's decision ... marks... a return to... the original meaning
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.").
98. See Stephanos Bibas, Oiginalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph ofJustice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 Geo. L.J. 183, 194
(2005) (explaining thatJustice Scalia's "reading of the Sixth Amendment dovetailed... with
solicitude for criminal defendants' due process rights").
99. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (majority opinion).
100. See id. at 636-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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example, a theory of linguistic meaning.10 1 On this account, an originalist
demands, at a definitional minimum, that legal change occur through
processes that count as legitimate by the lights of the generation that
ratified the relevant legal provision. Stare decisis, for example, was a well-
accepted mode of secular legal change for the founding generation. For
Baude, likewise, contemporary use and acceptance of stare decisis is
consistent with originalism insofar as that acceptance is grounded in the
high place of stare decisis within founding-era legal thought.10 2
Balkin also argues that what this Article calls standard nonoriginal-
ism is, in fact, originalism, but his claim differs from that of Sachs and
Baude. For Balkin, originalism requires interpreters to account for the
nature of constitutional language as a rule, standard, or principle."°3 The
use of precedent, consequences, moral theories, and other interpretive
devices to build out the application of constitutional standards over time
is not only consistent with originalism but is what it prescribes.1 4
This Article does not engage these arguments directly. The three
accounts just described are all about what originalism is. This question
might be relevant to certain political or philosophical debates, but when
it is answered by describing originalism as all-encompassing (or nearly
so), it loses its usefulness in identifying interesting variation in interpre-
tive practice. Sometimes courts rely on a relatively narrow set of historical
resources in answering constitutional questions. At other times, they treat
such resources with indifference or even hostility. If these approaches
vary systematically across types of cases or questions, a positive analysis of
constitutional practice should want to specify that variation. Calling it all
originalist is ultimately part of a normative rather than a positive project.
B. Rule Originalism
Proving that the Court tends to resort to originalism in cases about
constitutional rules would require a complex coding exercise, a large
dataset, and sophisticated empirical analysis. Under the circumstances,
proof is too ambitious an aim. Instead, I hope to supply enough data to
support a strong hypothesis that others are free to test, whether through
intuition, anecdote, or more rigorous methods.
Some coding is of course unavoidable. A typical constitutional opin-
ion contains multiple modes of analysis. Often a majority opinion, not
unlike a brief, argues that each mode-text, history, structure, precedent,
and consequences-points toward the same conclusion, or is at least not
101. See Sachs, Originalism as a Theory, supra note 12, at 820.
102. See Baude, supra note 12, at 2359-60.
103. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 3.
104. See id. at 6-7 (arguing that fidelity to the Constitution and original meaning
requires future generations to engage in constitutional interpretation and construction
when the Constitution uses vague standards or abstract principles).
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inconsistent with that conclusion. 10 5 To argue that an opinion is oni-
ginalist only when originalism is the sole mode of analysis or when it is
announced as dispositive is too demanding a measure. Rather, this sec-
tion codes as originalist those opinions in which analysis of The Federalist
Papers, the debates in the Philadelphia or state ratifying conventions, or
the views or expectations of members of the founding generation
(whether real or hypothetical) form a significant part of the opinion's
affirmative analysis. 1 6 An opinion in which those views or expectations
either are not mentioned, are merely gestured at, or are described only
as consistent with an outcome reached through other methods is not an
originalist opinion.
This section begins with two periods during which the Court is
sometimes said to have been nonoriginalist: the antebellum years and the
Warren Court era. If rule originalism is evident during these relatively
fallow periods, it can lend support to an intuition that identification of
constitutional rules is linked to originalist analysis.0 7
1. Antebellum Cases. - Some commentators have suggested that Dred
Scott v. Sandford10 8 may have been the Court's first original intent opin-
ion.10 9 Those commentators are wrong."0 Early Courts often reasoned by
reference to the expectations calcified at the moment of constitutional
105. See Fallon, Constructive Coherence Theory, supra note 16, at 1190-91.
106. What counts as the relevant founding generation of course depends on the
provision under analysis, though identifying the appropriate provision, and therefore
which founders to interrogate and heed, may itself be subject to motivated reasoning. See
Greene, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 89, at 979 (discussing originalists' thin
treatment of the Reconstruction era relative to the eighteenth-century founding).
107. See Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative
Constitutional Law 260 (2014) (discussing the "most difficult case" principle in which
presence of an outcome variable in its most challenging environment can substantially
support a causal inference).
108. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
109. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 Const.
Comment. 37, 49 (1993) (arguing that ChiefJustice Taney may have been the first jurist to
utilize originalist reasoning in a Supreme Court opinion); William E. Nelson, History and
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1237, 1237-38 (1986) ("[The]
process of using history to interpret the Constitution ... can be traced back at least to the
1857 case of Scott v. Sandford."); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case: With Notes
on Affirmative Action, the Right to Die & Same-Sex Marriage, 1 Green Bag 2d 39, 40
(1997) (calling Dred Scott "one of the first great cases unambiguously using the 'intent of
the framers').
110. Although what follows focuses on Supreme Court opinions, it is notable that
congressional debate over the role of the House of Representatives in considering the Jay
Treaty, which Professor H. Jefferson Powell calls "the most sustained early congressional
discussion of constitutional hermeneutics," was replete with extratextual references to the
state ratification debates. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 917-20 (1985). President George Washington relied in part
on his personal knowledge of the Philadelphia Convention debates in deciding to reject
the House's position. See id. at 921.
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drafting or ratification without accounting for subsequent practices,
precedents, or evolving thinking.
The various seriatim opinions in the Court's first significant
decision, Chisholm v. Georgia,"' decided in 1793, could easily be called
originalist in this sense, though the case's proximity to the Constitution's
ratification complicates any methodological assessment. Chisholm held
that the Article III grant of federal court jurisdiction in cases between "a
State and citizens of another State' '1 12 applied even when the state was
the defendant in an assumpsit action, thereby working an implicit
constitutional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The modem
Court has described the Chisholm majority as having ignored original
understanding,11" 3 but it is more accurate to say that the majority simply
adopted a different view of a genuine constitutional ambiguity. Notably,
two of the majority Justices, Justices Blair and Wilson, were signatories to
the Constitution,'14 and a third, Chief Justice Jay, was a co-author of The
Federalist Papers."5
Chief Justice Jay framed his inquiry in terms of the nature of
American sovereignty in light of the Revolution and post-Revolution
events. The people of the United States, he wrote, "continued to consider
themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they continued
without interruption to manage their national concerns accordingly."' 
16
Though his opinion is largely grounded in text and in a democratic ethos,
it quite clearly grounds itself in the politics of the 1780s.117
Justice Blair's opinion employed mostly textual and structural argu-
ment: The jurisdictional language of Article III appears to privilege neither
citizens nor states, and the very possibility of federal jurisdiction over
controversies involving states (as in state-state disputes, for example)
defeats the claim that states have some incorruptible sovereign dignity.118
Still, even this opinion speaks in the language of the consequences that
"were intended" by the Constitution rather than what is or must be." 9
Justice Cushing's opinion makes a similar set of arguments and is explicit
about the need to divine the "intent" and expectations of "the framers of
111. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793).
112. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 425.
113. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999) ("[T]he majority failed to address
either the practice or the understanding that prevailed in the States at the time the
Constitution was adopted.").
114. Teaching with Documents: Observing Constitution Day, Nat'l Archives, http://
www.archives.gov/education/lessons/constitution-day/signers.hmfl [http://perma.cc/HF54-
5WMA] (last visted Sept. 30, 2016).
115. The Federalist No. 5 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
116. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 470 (opinion ofJay, C.J.).
117. See id. at 470-71, 474-79.




the Constitution."'12° Presaging the Eleventh Amendment, Justice
Cushing's opinion offers further that "[i]f the Constitution is found
inconvenient in practice in this or any other particular, it is well that a
regular mode is pointed out for amendment." 121 Referring to Article V as
the repository for prudential concerns is a signal originalist move.
Justice Wilson's wide-ranging opinion is not easily characterized
methodologically. It touches upon the corporate character of a state,
122
the notion of sovereignty under traditional principles ofjurisprudence, 123
and the democratic foundations of state power.124 The part of his opinion
that appears most lawyerly to modern American eyes is his discussion of
whether the Constitution in fact abrogates Georgia's sovereign immu-
nity.125 Here the opinion repeatedly uses the language of what the
American people intended, drawing, for example, on the failure of the
Articles of Confederation grounded in its state-centered character.'
26
Justice Iredell argued that, absent a congressional statute, the Article
III grant of jurisdiction could only be considered an abrogation of
sovereign immunity if the kind of suit at issue in Chisholm would lie
against a state at common law.127 He found that it would not.12 Notably
for this Article's purposes, he began his analysis by asking what "the
Framers of the Constitution... meant" by "controversies" between a
state and a citizen of another state. 129 Moreover, Justice Iredell explicitly
used the time the Constitution was adopted as his temporal point of
reference for crystallizing the state of the common law and the expecta-
tions embedded within the Constitution. 1"°
Calder v. Bull13' stands as another early U.S. Supreme Court
constitutional decision in which the Court's mode of analysis focused
conspicuously on the intentions and expectations of the Constitution ab
initio. The question was whether a Connecticut law voiding a decision of
the probate court violated the prohibition on state ex post facto laws in
the federal Constitution. 3 2 Garnering the agreement of all but Justice
Cushing, Justice Chase found that the clause applied only to criminal
laws.'33 The opinion's interpretive approach zeroes in directly on the
120. Id. at 467-69 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
121. Id. at 468.
122. See id. at 455-56 (opinion of Wilson,J.).
123. See id. at 453-58.
124. See id. at 463-64.
125. See id. at 464-66.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 437 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
128. See id. at 439.
129. Id. at 432.
130. See id. at 434-35, 437.
131. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
132. Id. at 387 (opinion of Chase,J.).
133. See id. at 390-91.
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mischief that animated the clause-namely, a purported history of
arbitrary and vindictive abuses of criminal process by the British
Parliament."' Against this history, and in light of the Constitution's
general reservation of state legislative authority, Justice Chase wrote, a
literal reading of the ex post facto clauses-that is, one that would apply
them indiscriminately to all laws-was inappropriate. 13 5
In a third and much later antebellum case, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 3 6 the question was whether the Cherokee Nation was a "foreign
state," which would enable it to sue in federal court and contest alleged
treaty violations by Georgia. 137 Here, unlike in Chisholm and Calder, there
was quite a bit of water under the bridge. As Chief Justice Marshall
acknowledged in his opinion:
[The Cherokee] have been uniformly treated as a state from the
settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with
them by the United States recognize them as a people capable
of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being
responsible in their political character for any violation of their
engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens
of the United States by any individual of their community. Laws
have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our
government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state,
and the courts are bound by those acts. 3 1
Moreover, the Chief Justice suggested that the tribe's substantive
claims were compelling. In violation of treaties between the Cherokee
Nation and the United States, Georgia had passed a series of laws
annexing tribal land and denying Indians the right to appear in court to
assert their property and treaty rights. 139 Just before the case was heard,
the state had executed a Cherokee citizen for murder in defiance of a
federal court order, and President Andrew Jackson had removed federal
troops from Cherokee land at Georgia's request. 40 Many contemporary
observers considered Georgia's actions to be a trial balloon for the
doctrine of nullification, given its obvious implications for the integrity of
the union. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "If courts were permitted to
indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them can
scarcely be imagined." 141
134. See id. at 390.
135. See id. at 389.
136. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
137. See id. at 15-16 (discussing Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S.
Constitution).
138. Id. at 16.
139. Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: Story of the
Cherokee Cases, in Indian Law Stories 61, 65 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011).
140. Id. at 66-67.
141. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
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Neither long-standing practice nor the imbalanced equities of the
case proved decisive, however. Rather, what was dispositive for Chief
Justice Marshall was that "the framers of our constitution had not the
Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the union to
controversies between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign
states." 14 2 Chief Justice Marshall asserted that U.S. courts were not an
important forum for justice for tribal citizens "[a]t the time the
constitution was framed."1 4 Moreover, the Constitution itself lists "the
Indian Tribes" separately from "foreign Nations" in the Commerce
Clause.' Marshall was not simply making a structural or "intratextual"
point. 1 45 He wrote specifically that, in constructing the Commerce
Clause, "the convention considered [Indian tribes] as entirely distinct"
from foreign nations.1"
To the argument that Indian tribes are separately enumerated in
Article I, Section 8 only for clarity and emphasis rather than to suggest
mutual exclusivity, the Chief Justice dismissed the idea by reference to
the "view" of "the convention." 147 Language including Indian tribes as
foreign nations "would have suggested itself to statesmen who considered
the Indian tribes as foreign nations, and were yet desirous of mentioning
them particularly."148 To the argument that Indian tribes might be for-
eign nations notwithstanding the language of the Commerce Clause,
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the constitutional context did not per-
mit him to "impute to the convention the intention to desert its former
meaning."149 If Cherokee Nation v. Georgia is not an originalist decision,
then nothing is.
One should qualify that claim, as always with constitutional inter-
pretive claims, by considering the possibility that Chief Justice Marshall's
originalism was epiphenomenal. It would be reasonable to suppose that
constitutional history was not genuinely constraining but rather provided
a persuasive rhetoric of constraint, which is especially useful in cases of
great political moment. If the use of originalism follows only from the
political character of a dispute or some other idiosyncratic reason, rather
than from the structure of the questions the dispute presents, it would
present a challenge to this Article's thesis.
There are undoubtedly many constitutional cases throughout history
in which political calculations motivated a judge's interpretive choices.
142. Id. at 18.
143. Id. This assertion is contested. See Jill Norgren, The Cherokee Cases: The
Confrontation of Law and Politics 101 (1996).
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
145. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1999)
(outlining the intratextualist technique of constitutional interpretation).
146. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 19.




The evidence is unusually strong that Cherokee Nation is not such a case.
The jurisdictional question in Cherokee Nation was genuinely difficult.
William Wirt, the former Attorney General who represented the
Cherokee before the Supreme Court, harbored his own internal
doubts.15 ° Chief Justice Marshall, moreover, seemed receptive to the
Cherokee claims on the merits. Wirt had sought through back channels
to solicit Chief Justice Marshall's views prior to bringing suit.15 ' Without
discussing the jurisdictional hurdle, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in a
letter to Wirt's surrogate, Judge Carr, that he "wished sincerely that both
the Executive and Legislative departments had thought differently on the
subject" of the Indian Removal Act, which sought to displace tribes living
within state territory.'52 In the opinion itself, Chief Justice Marshall
suggested that a different vehicle would produce a different result,'15 and
Justice Story's dissenting opinion appears to have been written at the
ChiefJustice's suggestion. 15
4
The opportunity for a more suitable vehicle arrived the next year in
what became Worcester v. Georgia,'55 and this time Chief Justice Marshall
held in favor of Cherokee rights. Specifically, the Court found that
Georgia laws requiring whites to obtain a license to visit tribal lands were
preempted by federal treaties with the Cherokee. 156 It seems that the
problem with Cherokee Nation really was purely jurisdictional. It is also
noteworthy that Chief Justice Marshall's lengthy opinion in Worcester is
not originalist. It describes the continuous history of U.S.-Indian
relations without privileging the moment of constitutional founding or
mentioning drafters, the convention, or anyone's intentions. 157 The
preemption question at the heart of Worcester is about the application of a
constitutional standard to a set of facts. Originalism was accordingly not
the default mode of inquiry.
There are distinctions within originalism, of course, and this Article
does not suggest that they are trivial or unworthy of study. As Professor
H. Jefferson Powell has chronicled in his canonical article on the original
understanding of original intent, the originalism practiced in early
American cases bears the hallmarks of English statutory interpretation,
whose norms did not abide using the subjective intentions of legislative
drafters as an interpretive resource. 151 Powell writes, "The 'intent of the
150. See Norgren, supra note 143, at 99-100.
151. See Strickland, supra note 139, at 69-70.
152. Id. at 70 (quotingJoseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics,
and Morality, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500, 510 (1969)).
153. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20 ("The mere question of right might
perhaps be decided by this court in a proper case with proper parties.").
154. See Strickland, supra note 139, at 71.
155. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
156. See id. at 561.
157. See id. at 542-61.
158. See Powell, supra note 110, at 902-04.
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act' and the 'intent of the legislature' were interchangeable terms;
neither term implied that the interpreter looked at any evidence
concerning that 'intent' other than the words of the text and the com-
mon law background of the statute."159 At the time of Powell's article, this
observation counted as a critique of prominent originalists, whose
writings were focused on the subjective intentions of the framers. 160
Today, interpretation grounded in an "objectified" original intent is not
only considered originalist but is originalism's dominant normative
manifestation.
161
This discussion reveals that a discourse that takes the ideological
fight over originalism as its starting point can miss important features of
the available data. Chisholm, Calder, and Cherokee Nation are all cases about
the meaning of constitutional rules. Article III either abrogates state
sovereign immunity or it does not. The Ex Post Facto Clause either
applies outside of criminal law or it does not. An Indian tribe either is a
foreign state under Article III or it is not. These have the character of
factual questions that do not lend themselves to qualifiers (such as "on
balance") that imply sensitivity to context or practical reasoning. Reason-
able people might disagree as to how these ambiguities are best resolved,
and indeed both Chisholm and Cherokee Nation were decided over dissents.
But disagreement about the meaning and scope of these provisions
reflects a failure or oversight in constitutional design and foresight rather
than any inherent vagueness.
162
In adjudicating these cases, the Court adhered to the view that the
appropriate point of reference in divining the meaning and application
159. Id. at 897-98.
160. See Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the
Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev.
106, 108 (1989).
161. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 620
(1999) (arguing that intent should be construed from the text, not an otherwise
unexpressed source); Colby, supra note 13, at 739 ("H. Jefferson Powell's evidence that the
Framers did not intend intentionalist interpretation ... is actually a feather in the New
Originalism's cap; Powell's sources by and large support the claim that the Framers did
intend the text to be interpreted according to its objective public meaning.").
162. This premise may be a fiction. Constitutions memorialize political compromises
and may contain instances of calculated ambiguity, even with respect to rules. See
generally John E Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L.
Rev. 1939, 1945 (2011) ("Like most bargained-for texts, the Constitution's structural
provisions thus leave many important questions unaddressed."). The abrogation of state
sovereign immunity via Article III's jurisdictional provisions might be an example. See
John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional
Texts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663, 1674 (2004) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution itself is a
product of political negotiation and compromise); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the
Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 555, 627-36
(1994). The point is not that the original understanding tells us what the Constitution
"means" in some immanent sense, but rather that interpreters treat original understanding
in this way for certain kinds of constitutional questions.
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of the relevant provisions was the time of enactment. The various Justices
assumed that the expectations that attached at that time-whether those
of the framers or ratifiers or of the Constitution itself-should be
honored in the here and now. Dispute over the significance of this
temporal reference point has long marked the red and white roses of
U.S. constitutional theory: Is the Constitution living or is it dead?'63 It is
easy to read the opinions in Chisholm, Calder, and Cherokee Nation as siding
against the notion of a living constitution, at least as to the questions
those Courts were answering.
Contrast this approach with Chief Justice Marshall's approach in
McCulloch v. Maryland.'6 As in Cherokee Nation, Chief.Justice Marshall's
majority opinion begins with a discussion of prior practice and is explicit
about the political stakes involved,165 but unlike in Cherokee Nation,
established practice gives rise to a strong presumption as to the outcome.
The Bank of the United States, whose constitutionality Maryland had
placed at issue in McCulloch,"6 had originally been chartered by the first
Congress with the approval of President Washington, who had sought the
counsel of Attorney General Edmund Randolph, Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson, and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. 16 7
It was chartered over Jefferson's and Randolph's opposition, as well as
that of James Madison, whom Washington asked to prepare a potential
veto message."6 As President, Madison initially let the charter lapse after
a twenty-year run, but he later changed his mind in response to a fiscal
crisis and signed the second bank bill into law in 1816.169 Wrote Chief
Justice Marshall, "It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to
assert that a measure adopted under these circumstances was a bold and
plain usurpation, to which the Constitution gave no countenance."'1 70
This preamble appears long before Chief Justice Marshall's memor-
able injunction that the Necessary and Proper Clause must be construed
liberally, for it is part of a "constitution intended to endure for ages to
163. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("[T] he Great
Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers' intent and
objective meaning, but rather that between original meaning (whether derived from
Framers' intent or not) and current meaning.").
164. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
165. See id. at 400-01.
166. McCulloch was a test case, so it was not Maryland alone. See Daniel A. Farber, The
Story of McCulloch: Banking on National Power, in Constitutional Law Stories 33, 44
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
167. See Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., The First Bank of the United States 3 (2009),
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/economic-education/first-bank.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 12.
170. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
1666 [Vol. 116:1639
RULE ORIGINALISM
come, and, consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs."' 71 It is possible to understand this language as originalist of a
sort, and some commentators have so construed it. 1 72 Chief Justice
Marshall's argument was that giving deference to Congress to determine
the means through which its powers may be executed satisfied "the
intention of those who gave these powers."' 73 But in the context of the
McCulloch opinion, this language serves to deemphasize founding-era
expectations as to whether Congress had been given the power to incor-
porate a bank. The suggestion that Congress's Article I powers be judged
"not directly, but at one remove"' 1 is a delegation that reflects a judg-
ment about judgment. Words and phrases like "regulate" and "necessary
and proper" may be applied differently by reasonable people to the same
set of facts, and so efficient and democratic governance counsels that
courts leave their application to Congress in the first instance. The
reasoning of McCulloch reveals Chief Justice Marshall's understanding of
the case to be about standards rather than rules.
175
This subsection began with a reference to Dred Scott. As noted above,
Dred Scott's holding that black Americans could not be citizens of a state
for Article III purposes is self-consciously originalist. It is also a case
about the meaning of a constitutional rule-namely, the rule that
individuals may invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts only
if they are citizens of a state.' 7 6 Chief Justice Taney's originalism is often
disparaged (along with all else he touches),177 but it should have been
expected in light of the nature of the question he was answering.
This discussion lends some support to the idea that rule originalism
has long characterized U.S. constitutional interpretation, but this Article
does not depend on this claim. It nonetheless buttresses the assertion
171. Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted).
172. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text,
Precedent, and Burke, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 635, 646 (2006) ("Marshall may have been wrong
about the original meaning of the Commerce [Clause], but his opinion[] in... McCulloch
[was] an attempt at a textual and originalist interpretation . ).
173. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.
174. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. Notice that in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Chief Justice
Marshall gave no deference to what he construed to be Congress's judgment, in § 13 of
the Judiciary Act, that Congress had the authority to expand the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. See id. at 173-76. For Chief Justice Marshall, the clauses of Article III
allocating original and appellate jurisdiction, read as a whole, deny Congress the power to
make that assignment. See id. at 174. One could describe this aspect of Marbury as
implicating the meaning of a constitutional rule. Though Marshall's discussion on this
point is not overtly originalist, neither is it nonoriginalist.
176. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 426-27 (1857) (holding that Dred Scott was
not a citizen of Missouri and as such was not entitled to rue in federal court based on
Article III of the Constitution). Individuals who are subjects of a foreign state may also
invoke diversity jurisdiction. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
177. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 407 (2011).
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that rule originalism characterizes modern U.S. constitutional interpreta-
tion. The next two sections push into the twentieth century and beyond.
Before getting there, however, it is important to take note of
something else that McCulloch helps us to see. Whether the Constitution's
enumerated powers, including the Necessary and Proper Clause, qualify
as rules or standards was not a threshold question in McCulloch but rather
went straight to the merits. Recall Chief Justice Marshall's discussion of
the word "necessary."178 Sometimes the word "import[s] an absolute
physical necessity, so strong, that one thing, to which another may be
termed necessary, cannot exist without that other."179 At other times the
word "imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or
essential to another."'8 ° In other words, sometimes it signifies a rule and
sometimes a standard. Which one is precisely what divided McCulloch's
merits position from Maryland's.'8 1
The fact that the inquiry into whether a constitutional question is
about a rule or a standard can bleed into the merits should not deter us.
This Article's claim is not that the structure of the question an
interpreter faces is self-evident, nor is it that it necessarily commands the
consensus of the constitutional community (though it often does), nor is
it that the constitutional text supplies the answer. The text is a focal point
of constitutional interpretation in the United States, 182 but the range of
questions it answers standing alone is a narrow if not null set. 183 The
Article's argument is rather that the method to which constitutional
interpreters default often reflects a set of assumptions the interpreter
makes about the nature of the question she is answering. Those
assumptions emerge not from metaphysics but from substantive views
about constitutional law."s What is remarkable is that what follows from
those assumptions-originalist methods for rules but not standards-is
not a source of conflict but rather a shared premise of constitutional
interpreters in the United States.
2. The Warren Court. - The most famously nonoriginalist Court was
the Warren Court, 185 whose decisions inspired the originalism movement
178. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-19.
179. Id. at 413.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 413 ("But the argument on which most reliance is placed, is drawn
from the peculiar language of this clause.").
182. See Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297, 298 (2001); David A. Strauss, Common Law,
Common Ground, andJefferson's Principle, 112 Yale L.J. 1717, 1733-34 (2003).
183. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the
Constitutional Text, 64 Duke L.J. 1213, 1216 (2015); Strauss, Does the Constitution, supra
note 8, at 3.
184. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 10, at 496 ("There is no single,
noncontroversial way to determine the extent to which a norm io rule like.").




of the 1980s. Nearly all of the Warren Court's famous decisions are
nonoriginalist. Less obvious is that nearly all of the Warren Court's
famous decisions are cases about the application of constitutional
standards. Most of the cases that give the Warren Court its reputation
involve the Equal Protection Clause,'18 6 the First Amendment, 187 or the
Due Process Clause. 188 These provisions contain the Constitution's most
recognized standards.
The Warren Court did of course adjudicate cases involving the
meaning of constitutional rules. Two cases involving structural features of
the federal political process-Powell v. McCormack 89 and Wesberry v.
Sanders' 9 -provide perhaps the clearest examples. Powell required the
Court to determine whether Article I, Section 5, which provides that
"[e]ach House shall be the judge of the.., qualifications of its own
members," permits the House of Representatives to refuse to seat an
elected Representative based on his or her failure to meet qualifications
other than those enumerated in Article I, Section 2.91 That section limits
House membership to persons who are at least twenty-five years old, have
been a citizen for seven years, and are inhabitants of the state in which
they are elected. 9 2
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. filed suit after the House voted to exclude
him based on various corruption allegations. 93 Writing for a 7-1 majority,
Chief Justice Warren understood the key issue to be a prototypical rule
question: "the meaning of the phrase to 'be the Judge of the Qualifications
of its own Members.""94 In determining that the Constitution empowered
the House to judge only the constitutionally enshrined qualifications of
members, the Court did not entertain the possibility that the
Constitution was living, adaptable, or anything other than fixed at the
moment of its adoption. Indeed, the Court specifically and forcefully
rejected living constitutionalism in this context.
186. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
187. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that a law
against the mutilation of draft cards was not a violation of free speech rights but
announcing a standard that places a heightened burden on government regulation of
expressive conduct); NY Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that
common law defamation suits are constrained by the First Amendment); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding teacher-led prayers in public schools are a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
188. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
189. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
190. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
191. See Powell 395 U.S. at 489-93.
192. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
193. See Powell 395 U.S. at 489-90.
194. Id. at 521 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I., § 5).
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Chief Justice Warren-Powell edition-is a model originalist. In
considerable detail, the opinion canvasses English and colonial practices
regarding legislative decisions to exclude members195 and the debates in
the Philadelphia Convention and in the state ratifying conventions.
196
Chief Justice Warren did consider post-ratification practice and noted
that on several occasions after ratification both the House and the Senate
had excluded elected candidates for reasons going beyond the
qualifications listed in Article I, Section 2.197 Remarkably, however, Chief
Justice Warren-the author of Brown' S8-argued that post-ratification
practice bears limited interpretive weight when it departs from original
intent. He writes:
Had these congressional exclusion precedents been more
consistent, their precedential value still would be quite
limited .... Particularly in view of the Congress' own doubts in
those few cases where it did exclude members-elect, we are not
inclined to give its precedents controlling weight. The relevancy
of prior exclusion cases is limited largely to the insight they afford in
correctly ascertaining the draftsmen's intent. Obviously, therefore,
the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in
proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787.199
Without a theory of why a case like Brown engages different interpretive
instincts than a case like Powell, this language seems disingenuous. This
Article supplies such a theory.
A second Warren Court political-process decision, Wesberry, provides
another useful test, especially when paired with the Court's decision the
same Term in Reynolds v. Sims.2 °1 Wesberry held that the Constitution
requires that congressional districts be equal in population. 20 ' Reynolds
held that the Constitution requires roughly the same equality for state
legislative districts. 20 2 The two decisions came down within four months
195. See id. at 522-31. The opinion places great weight on the resolution of the
famous John Wilkes case. Wilkes was thrice reelected to Parliament after being convicted
of seditious libel, and each time Parliament refused to seat him. See id. at 527-28. In 1782,
Wilkes successfully persuaded the House of Commons to expunge the expulsion resolu-
tions on the ground that they had been, in effect, nullified by the people themselves. See
id. at 528.
196. See id. at 532-41.
197. See id. at 544-46.
198. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954) ("In approaching this
problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or
even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation.").
199. Powell, 395 U.S. at 545-47 (emphasis added).
200. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
201. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
202. The Reynolds Court permitted "[s]omewhat more flexibility" in state legislative
districting than i! permitted in congressional apportionment. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578.
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of each other, with identical majorities. 213 Wesberry is a thoroughgoing
originalist opinion, and Reynolds is not originalist at all. Why?
For one thing, Wesberry was written by originalist Justice Black and
Reynolds by Chief Justice Warren, but as seen above, Warren was fully
capable of writing an originalist opinion. More significant was that the
constitutional question in Wesberry was different. Article I, Section 2
provides that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States .... 204 Justice Black's opinion reads an equality requirement into
the words "the People," understanding the language to enact a rule that,
within each state, legislative districts should be of equal size. 20 5 Wesberry is
clearly originalist. Justice Black wrote that the constitutional provision
must be "construed in its historical context,"20 6 the question is framed as
what "the Framers of the Constitution intended ' 20 7 or "meant, '28 the
disposition means to honor "a principle tenaciously fought for and
established at the Constitutional Convention,"' 20 9 and nearly every word
of the opinion is devoted to elaborating the views held at the
Philadelphia Convention and articulated in The Federalist Papers. Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion bemoans the opinion's inattention to
contrary precedent210 and contemporary consequences, 211 opening with a
consequentialist lament: "I had not expected to witness the day when the
Supreme Court of the United States would render a decision which casts
grave doubt on the constitutionality of the composition of the House of
Representatives." 212
Contrast Wesberry with Reynolds. Reynolds was decided not on the basis
of Article I, Section 2, which does not apply to state legislative districting,
but rather the Equal Protection Clause, a constitutional standard.2 1 3
Reynolds contains not a word about the intentions of the framers or
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment (or any other constitutional
provision), the original understandings of the ratifying generation, or
the lessons of preconstitutional practices. Rather, the opinion is replete
203. The lineups for each majority opinion were Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Black, Douglas, Brennan, White, and Goldberg.
204. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
205. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8 ("[T]he command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives
be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." (quoting U.S.
Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1)). Early in U.S. history, congressional delegations were typically elected
at large. See id. at 8.
206. Id. at 7.
207. Id. at 8.
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. at 8.
210. See id. at 45-47 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
211. See id. at48.
212. Id. at 20.
213. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964).
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with references to the case law of the Court and reasons from first
principles. 214 The only relevant "history" for the Court was "a continuing
expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country."215 Justice
Harlan's dissent this time was not consequentialist: "The Court's
constitutional discussion.., is remarkable.., for its failure to address
itself at all to the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole or to the legislative
history of the Amendment pertinent to the matter at hand."2 6 The
Court's failure to discuss history in Reynolds seems ever more remarkable
in light of the almost polar opposite mode of inquiry it took in Wesberry.
The structure of the question the Court took itself to be answering
provides a ready explanation.
The juxtaposition of Wesberry and Reynolds calls to mind the
discussion above of the symbiosis between an interpreter's judgment as to
whether a constitutional question is a rule or a standard and the degrees
of freedom the answer affords. That is, one suspects that a conclusion
that the Court has broad latitude to depart from original understanding
motivates its assessment of the kind of question it is answering, and vice
versa.
We see this dialectic at play in the Warren Court's criminal
procedure jurisprudence. The criminal procedure revolution the Warren
Court fomented and witnessed was enabled, at least notionally, by its
resolution of the debate over whether and how the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights. Total incorporation, which
Justice Black urged,2 17 would have maintained the rule-like structure of
many of the criminal procedure provisions of the Constitution, especially
in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Both selective incorporation, often
associated with Justice Brennan,21 8 and nonincorporation, embodied by
Justice Frankfurter,21 9 require ajudge to determine the interplay between
particular criminal procedural rights and the due process standard of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, the Court's leading originalist
214. See, e.g., id. at 565 ("Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative
government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a
majority of that State's legislators.").
215. Id. at 555.
216. Id. at 590 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The inconsistency in justice Harlan's dissents
does not undermine this Article's claims. Dissenting opinions obey different interpretive
and rhetorical conventions than majority opinions. See Lani Guinier, Foreword:
Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 18-23 (2008).
217. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "one of the chief objects" of the Fourteenth Amendment "was to make the
Bill of Rights[] applicable to the states").
218. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 761, 769 (1961) (describing selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights as a "process
of absorption").
219. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of




framed the incorporation question in terms of a set of rules, which in
turn invited originalism, and its leading living constitutionalists framed it
in terms of a standard, which invited dynamic interpretation.
Consider Rochin v. Calfornia.22° Police came upon Rochin in his
apartment and witnessed him swallow two morphine capsules.2 1 Con-
cerned that a criminal suspect was destroying evidence, they took Rochin
to a hospital, intubated him, and pumped an emetic solution into his
stomach, whereupon he vomited out the capsules.222 The question was
whether convicting him on the basis of this evidence violated the
Constitution.223 Likening the sequence of events to a coerced confession,
Justice Frankfurter wrote for the majority that the officers' conduct
"shock[ed] the conscience" and therefore violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
224
Justice Frankfurter was conscious of the dependent relationship
between the structure of the relevant constitutional question and the
interpretive methods those questions call for:
In dealing not with the machinery of government but with
human rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity
of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of
constitutional provisions. Words being symbols do not speak
without a gloss. On the one hand the gloss may be the deposit
of history, whereby a term gains technical content. Thus the
requirements of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments for trial by
jury in the federal courts have a rigid meaning. No changes or
chances can alter the content of the verbal symbol of 'jury"-a
body of twelve men who must reach a unanimous conclusion if
the verdict is to go against the defendant. On the other hand,
the gloss of some of the verbal symbols of the Constitution does
not give them a fixed technical content. It exacts a continuing
process of application. When the gloss has thus not been fixed
but is a function of the process of judgment, the judgment is
bound to fall differently at different times and differently at the
same time through different judges.22 5
This excerpt provides a rough synopsis of this Article's positive thesis.
Unlike his understanding of "due process of law," Justice Frankfurter
construed the meaning of "jury" to form part of a constitutional rule
with a fixed content that resists evolving application. 2 6
220. 342 U.S. 165 (1951).
221. Id. at 166.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 168.
224. Id. at 172-73.




Prior Court dicta concerning the size of ajury appear to support this
view.22 7 Tellingly, when the Court later revisited the question of jury size
in Williams v. Florida, the majority used the views of the framers to rebut
what it called a "historical accident" that should not be "immutably codi-
fied into our Constitution."2 28 Justice White's majority opinion in Williams
devotes much effort to arguing that the framers intended the word 'jury"
to be understood flexibly.2 29 In other words, his opinion tries to argue
that 'jury" was intended to be a standard, not a rule. In light of the
symbiosis this Article identifies, Justice White's line of argument is to be
expected.
Justice Black concurred in the judgment in Rochin.23 ° For him, the
officers' forcible extraction of evidence violated Rochin's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, incorporated jot forjot against the states.2 31
Justice Black criticized the "evanescent standards of the majority's
philosophy," preferring "faithful adherence to the specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights." 2 32 It is easy, then, to overlook that the judgment itself
was not the sole ground of concurrence between the two philosophic
foes. Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter agreed, as Justice White and
Justice Frankfurter did implicitly, that the appropriate interpretive
approach follows from the structure of the constitutional question.
"Some constitutional provisions are stated in absolute and unqualified
language," Justice Black wrote in Rochin, referencing the First
Amendment. 233 "Other constitutional provisions do require courts to
choose between competing policies, such as the Fourth Amendment
which, by its terms, necessitates a judicial decision as to what is an
'unreasonable' search or seizure."23 4 Consistent with this commitment,
Justice Black's opinions applying the Fourth Amendment do not use
originalist methods.23 5
227. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898) (asserting that the jury
referred to in the Sixth Amendment reflects "the meaning affixed to [it] in the law as it
was in this country and in England at the time of the adoption ,f" the Constitution,
meaning "ajury constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons").
228. 399 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1970).
229. Id. at 92-100.
230. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174 (Black, J, concurring).
231. Id. at 174-75.
232. Id. at 175, 177.
233. Id. at 176; see also Black, supra note 60, at 867 ("It is my belief that there are
'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by men who
knew what word, meant, and meant their prohibitions to be 'absolutes."').
234. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 176.
235. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964); District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). Justice Black also joined
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), which committed the
Court to interpreting the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments in




3. Other Cases. - Many of the Court's most thoroughgoing originalist
opinions emerge from cases about the meaning of a constitutional rule.
As noted above, a truly disciplined positive account of the relationship
between originalism and rules would leave no bandwidth for the
normative inquiry of Part III or the justiciability implications discussed in
Part IV. What follows instead is a sample of rule-originalist opinions
designed to give the reader a window into an intuition that, this Article
argues, is a general one.
Begin with two recent decisions that Part IV revisits below: Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AJRC) 23 6
and NLRB v. Noel Canning.237 At issue in AIRC was whether, consistent
with the Elections Clause, a state could vest the conclusive power to
construct congressional districts in an independent redistricting commis-
sion rather than in the state legislature. 23 8 The Elections Clause states, as
immediately relevant, that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof .... ,"239 The constitutional question,
then, was whether the word "Legislature" as used in that provision could
encompass an independent commission incorporated into the state con-
stitution through a ballot initiative. 2M
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the majority opinion, is not an
originalist, nor is any other member of her five-Justice majority.2 41 Yet the
foundation of the opinion's merits analysis resides in the eighteenth
century: "The dominant purpose of the Elections Clause, the historical
record bears out, was to empower Congress to override state election
rules, not to restrict the way States enact legislation." 242 Justice Ginsburg
constructed the historical record from a standard originalist toolkit:
founding-era dictionaries, The Federalist Papers, the Convention debates,
and debates in the state ratifying conventions. 243 The opinion notes that
"[t]he Framers may not have imagined the modem initiative process,"
but rather than using that observation as an invitation to dynamic
interpretation, Justice Ginsburg instead situated the initiative within a
conception of popular governance that she associated with Madison,
Hamilton, and the Declaration of Independence. 244
In Noel Canning, another of the Court's nonoriginalists, Justice
Breyer, wrote a largely, though not entirely, originalist opinion. Article II
236. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
237. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
238. AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
239. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
240. AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2659.
241. Justice Ginsburg's opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan.
242. AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2671.
243. Id. at 2671-72.
244. See id. at 2674-75.
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gives the President the power "to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session." 245 This power stands as an
exception to the ordinary requirement of obtaining the Senate's advice
and consent to the appointment of federal officers. 24 Noel Canning
required the Court to determine the meaning of "vacancies that may
happen" and "the recess of the Senate. ' 24 7 The recess appointments
power was designed to ensure the continuity of government during the
long periods in which it was assumed the Senate would be unable to
convene.248 In the horse-and-buggy era, one would not expect anything
other than a lengthy recess, but in the modem era the Senate might take
a break for a month or a weekend. Moreover, whether a President could
use the recess appointments power to fill a vacancy that arose while the
Senate was in session but that continued into a recess was ambiguous
from the start. Presidents had a long history of filling appointments in
this way, and making their own determinations as to when the Senate was
in recess, but the Senate also had a long history of objections.24 9
Justice Breyer's majority opinion begins its analysis with the
admonition that "in interpreting the [Recess Appointments] Clause, we
put significant weight upon historical practice. '250 In light of that
assertion, one could be forgiven in coding the opinion as nonoriginalist.
The opinion indeed devotes much of its analysis to post-ratification
practices of the political branches, and the Court's conclusions that an
intrasession recess qualifies as "the recess of the Senate" and that a
vacancy that arises during a session may be filled through a recess
appointment are both consistent with those practices. 251 But Justice
Breyer's opinion reaches both conclusions only after canvassing the ori-
ginal meaning of these terms and concluding that they are ambiguous. 252
Consistent with his jurisprudential orientation, it may well be that Justice
Breyer was committed to being guided by practice and by conse-
245. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
246. Id. cl. 2.
247. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567 (2014) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3).
248. See id.; Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess
Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1487, 1498 (2005).
249. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2562-64, 2570-73.
250. Id. at 2559 (emphasis omitted).
251. Id. at 2567, 2573 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 3).
252. See id.; Baude, supra note 12, at 2373 (arguing that despite Justice Scalia's
critique of Justice Breyer's citations to historical practice, their opinions "actually do
agree... about the role of the text and its original meaning"). Justice Breyer's sources
included founding-era dictionaries, the Convention debates, contemporaneous state
practice, and the views of Thomas Jefferson. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561, 2567-68.
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quences, 253 but it is telling that-rather than ignoring original intentions,
which happens all the time in Court opinions-he appeared to find it
necessary to conclude that those intentions were unclear. In fact, Justice
Breyer even justified his decision to look to historical practice by
referring to Madison's articulation of what "was foreseen at the birth of
the Constitution"-namely that "difficulties and differences of opinion"
in interpreting the Constitution "might require a regular course of
practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them."254
Perhaps the best known example of well-established political
practices coming into tension with the original understanding of a consti-
tutional rule is INS v. Chadha.255 Congress had created an administrative
structure under which the Attorney General was empowered to suspend
removal of certain deportable aliens, subject to a veto by a vote of the
House of Representatives. 256 The question was whether this scheme
violated the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment require-
ments. 257 Congress had included one-house-veto provisions in hundreds
of laws over a half century leading up to the Chadha decision; such
provisions served as a counterweight to the broad delegation to agencies
that had come to characterize the modern administrative state.25 8
The Chadha Court made no bones about the power of original
understanding in the face of later contrary practice. Chief Justice
Burger's analysis for the majority begins by noting that " [c] onvenience
and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of
democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than
blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with
increasing frequency .... -"259 Rather, the opinion argues, the practices
relevant to the constitutionality of the one-house veto were those anti-
cipated by and familiar to the framers. 26 0 The Chief Justice emphasizes
the centrality of bicameralism and presentment to the Constitution's
drafters, and Madison and Hamilton in particular, using the Convention
debates and The Federalist Papers as his main text.261 Other constitutional
provisions thought consistent with bicameralism and presentment as the
253. See Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View 80-87 (2011)
(describing Justice Breyer's pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation that draws
from a variety of sources).
254. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Spencer
Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 Writings ofJames Madison 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908)).
255. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
256. See id. at 923-25.
257. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President of the United States. .. ").
258. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 984-87.
259. Id. at 944 (majority opinion).




sole avenues for legislation are presented as reflecting what "the Framers
intended. 262
In both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion of Justice
White, the weight of original understandings in their analyses turns on
the authors' assessments of the specificity of the relevant provisions and
the constitutional intentions that specificity infers.263 For Chief Justice
Burger, "[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution
prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the
Executive in the legislative process.... [T]he precise terms of those
familiar provisions are critical to the resolution of these cases .... 264
And here isJustice White:
The Constitution does not directly authorize or prohibit the
legislative veto. Thus, our task should be to determine whether
the legislative veto is consistent with the purposes of Art. I and
the principles of separation of powers which are reflected in
that Article and throughout the Constitution. We should not
find the lack of a specific constitutional authorization for the
legislative veto surprising, and I would not infer disapproval of
the mechanism from its absence. From the summer of 1787 to
the present the Government of the United States has become
an endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers. Only
within the last half century has the complexity and size of the
Federal Government's responsibilities grown so greatly that the
Congress must rely on the legislative veto as the most effective,
if not the only means to insure its role as the Nation's lawmaker.
But the wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate that the Nation
would grow and new problems of governance would require
different solutions. Accordingly, our Federal Government was
intentionally chartered with the flexibility to respond to
contemporary needs without losing sight of fundamental
democratic principles.265
For this constitutional question, as with the question in Noel
Canning, the race to contemporary practice as a source of interpretive
authority required an originalist pit stop, if only to establish that what
appears to be a constitutional rule should not be so understood. In
countless cases involving constitutional standards, no stop is needed.
One could go on. There are many cases in which the Court adopts
originalist analysis to answer constitutional-rule questions, often so in-
stinctively that it escapes a casual reader's notice. In Myers v. United States,
Chief Justice Taft began his analysis of whether the President's power of
removal is exclusive with a detailed discussion of the lessons of the
262. Id. at 955.
263. See id. at 946-59 (majority opinion), 978-84 (White, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 945 (majority opinion).
265. Id. at 977-78 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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Convention debates, the practices of the First Congress, and various state-
ments by Hamilton. 26 In Nixon v. United States, Chief Justice Rehnquist
turned to the framers for guidance on whether the Court has power to
review the use of a Senate committee to hear evidence in an
impeachment trial against a federal officer.26 7 For the Court, that power
turns on whether the Senate's "sole power to try all Impeachments" gives
rise to a rule of exclusivity that precludes judicial second-guessing.2" In
Utah v. Evans, the Court, via Justice Breyer, used proceedings in
Philadelphia, eighteenth-century dictionaries, and contemporaneous
legal documents to find that the Constitution's requirement of an "actual
[e]numeration" for Census purposes269 does not preclude certain
statistical imputation methods by the lights of what "the Framers
expected." 27 Or take Freytag v. Commissioner, in which the Court held that
the ChiefJudge of the Tax Court could be empowered to appoint special
trial judges because that court was a "Court[] of Law" within the
meaning of the Appointments Clause. 271' The Court's substantive discus-
sion began with references to "the Framers... views of the appointments
power.272 The very first paragraph of Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
begins thus: "The leading Framers of our Constitution viewed the
principle of separation of powers as the central guarantee of a just
government.2 71 3 A quote from Federalist No. 47 follows that sentence.
It is common for questions about the meaning of constitutional
rules to arise in separation of powers cases, for a Constitution ordinarily
aspires to define the relations between the institutions of state with some
specificity. But governmental structure is not the sole domain of rules
questions. Dred Scott v. Sandford was a rights case, as was District of
Columbia v. Heller. The potential for a constitutional-rule case arises
whenever a rights question turns on whether someone falls into a
constitutionally fixed category of rights bearers. Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Roe, otherwise famously indifferent to the original
expectations of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers or ratifiers,274
relies on the relatively liberalized abortion regulation of the nineteenth
century in support of the claim that a fetus is not a "person" within the
meaning of that Amendment.275 And although Santa Clara County v.
266. See 272 U.S. 52, 109-39 (1926).
267. See 506 U.S. 224, 229-35 (1993).
268. Id. at 233-35 (discussing Article I of the U.S. Constitution).
269. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
270. 536 U.S. 452, 474-79 (2002).
271. See 501 U.S. 868, 888-92 (1991).
272. Id. at 884-85.
273. Id. at 870.
274. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortion, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95
Va. L. Rev. 253, 256, 258 (2009).
275. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
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Southern Pacific Railroad,2 76 the case sometimes cited for the proposition
that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 77 contains no analysis or even discussion of that
constitutional question, subsequent analyses of corporate constitutional
personhood have been squarely originalist in form.
2 78
C. Alternative Hypotheses
The claim that resort to originalism turns on the structure of the
constitutional question is in tension with at least three well-pedigreed
positions in constitutional theory. The first is that U.S. courts are never
or virtually never originalist, a position associated with Professor David
Strauss. The second position is that U.S. courts are always originalist,
which is associated with Baude and Balkin. The third position is that U.S.
courts are sometimes originalist and sometimes not, but that the
difference turns on factors other than the structure of the constitutional
question the interpreter understands herself to be answering, which is
associated with Professors Philip Bobbitt and Richard Fallon. This section
addresses each of these positions in turn. In comparing this Article's
position to the ones it rejects, the measure of the best account is not
whether counterexamples are evident. Judges have many reasons for
using history or declining to do so. Instead, the measure is which account
best accommodates current practices, even if the fit is imperfect.
Strauss has for many years defended a common law approach to
constitutional interpretation. 279 Strauss's case for common law constitu-
tionalism is both normative and positive. He argues not just that, for
various reasons discussed in Part III below, originalist methods are
inferior to evolving ones, but also that originalist cases are rare. "The
original understandings play a role only occasionally, and usually they are
makeweights, or the Court admits that they are inconclusive," 280 he
writes. "In controversial areas at least-leaving aside such things as the
length of the president's term of office-the governing principles of
constitutional law are the product of precedents, not of the text or the
original understandings."' 281
Much of this Part has endeavored to show that Strauss is wrong. It is
true that much of constitutional law is worked out through precedents
and that the text and original understandings-at least at a narrow level
276. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
277. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
278. See, e.g., id. at 577-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. V. Johnson,
303 U.S. 77, 85-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving
Corporate Personhood, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1629, 1642.
279. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 877, 890 (1996).
280. David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 33 (2010).
281. Id. at 44.
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of generality-often play little or no role. But it is not true that the areas
in which original understandings predominate are uncontroversial or
involve questions so obvious that they fail to generate litigation. It is not
just Heller and Crawford and Apprendi but also AIRC and Evans and
Chadha and Powell and Wesberry and Cherokee Nation and many other cases
implicating the meaning of a constitutional rule. The determinant is not
whether a constitutional norm is unclear but rather how it is unclear.
This argument also sits uncomfortably beside the view opposite
Strauss's that U.S. constitutional interpretation is always or usually origi-
nalist. Section II.A above discusses this set of views. In brief, Baude has
argued that certain practices that scholars code as nonoriginalist, notably
reliance on precedent and evolving construction of vague provisions, are
consistent with founding-era approaches to interpretation and so can be
recoded as originalist.2 2 Balkin argues that originalist interpretation
requires that interpreters pay attention to and take guidance from the
structure of a constitutional norm as a rule, standard, or principle.
As noted above, this Article does not challenge these accounts
directly. I do not believe the reason participants in the constitutional
culture are comfortable with evolving interpretations of constitutional
standards or reliance on precedent is because of the founding-era pedi-
gree of such methods, but that point of disagreement with Baude (to the
extent it is even a disagreement) is not crucial to this Article's thesis. I
also would not ascribe nearly as capacious a definition as either Baude or
Balkin gives to "originalism," but I have no real quarrel here with their
wish to understand it broadly. As noted, however, one consequence of
their broad, deliberately counterintuitive definitions of originalism is that
these definitions force them to focus their attention on their own
"difficult" cases. Because they are most interested in constitutional stan-
dards, both Baude and Balkin repeat Strauss's mistake of assuming that
cases about structural or rule-like constitutional provisions are too easy to
raise interesting interpretive questions.
Baude's only reference to the kinds of cases that result in rules ques-
tions appears in a section of his article that refers to questions such as
"Who is the President?," "Who is in Congress?," and "Who is on the
Supreme Court?. '"283 He calls these "easy" cases and writes that "there is
nearly universal agreement about how to answer them"-namely the
constitutional text.28 As noted, these are not always easy questions: Powell
v. McCormack was quite explicitly about who is in Congress. The meaning
of the Natural Born Citizen Clause as applied to those who are made
282. See Baude, supra note 12, at 2356-61. There is more nuance to Baude's argument
than reported here. For example, reliance on precedent is only consistent with original
understandings insofar as its authority comes from reliance interests rather than from any
capacity to alter constitutional meaning. See id. at 2361. This distinction marks a crucial
point of divergence between Baude and Balkin. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 121-22.
283. Baude, supra note 12, at 2367.
284. Id. at 2367-68.
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citizens at birth based on congressional acts is hardly straightforward and
was heavily debated during the primary season of the 2016 presidential
election.285 This Clause defines who may be President. What distinguishes
these cases, again, is not that they are easy (indeed, the text is sometimes
quite inadequate in answering them), but that they are governed by con-
stitutional rules. And because these cases are not always easy, one needs
an account that shows rather than simply tells what interpretive infer-
ences the cases support.
This Article is sympathetic to Balkin's distinction between rules and
standards and the implications that follow from that identification. Still,
all of the in-depth examples appearing in Balkin's book, Living
Originalism, involve constitutional standards. 286 When he discusses rules,
briefly, his examples are all the kinds of rules whose application he
assumes to be uncontroversial: "There are only two houses of Congress,
each state gets two senators, the president can veto legislation when it is
presented to him, the president's term lasts only four years, and the pres-
ident cannot be elected to more than two full terms. ' 28 7 These examples
create several misimpressions that this Article seeks to correct. First, it
suggests, like Baude's examples, that rules are too easily understood to
give rise to interesting interpretive questions. 288 Second, in not including
any hard cases, it suggests that an interpreter may readily and
categorically distinguish provisions as rules or not rules, when this ques-
tion is often contested. Third, Balkin's examples are suggestive of the
fallacy that constitutional provisions either are rules or are not rules-
constitutively-when in fact this determination depends on the question
one is asking about them.289 Whether "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech" is a rule changes depending on
whether one is asking what "Congress" means or what "abridging the
freedom of speech" means. 29 Because he is distracted (willfully) by the
question of what originalism is, Balkin offers no sustained account of
what internal variation within his version of originalism looks like.
A third position on the place of originalism within constitutional law
is offered by pluralists, such as Bobbitt and Fallon, who offer accounts
that emphasize the heterogeneity of interpretive methods. This Article's
thesis is that interpretive methods are heterogeneous: So far so good. But
this Article also claims that the heterogeneity of methods is systematic,
varying with the structure of the question the interpreter understands
herself to be answering. Neither Bobbitt's nor Fallon's influential plur-
alist accounts makes anything like this claim. For Bobbitt, an interpreter's
285. See McManamon, supra note 3 (discussing political debate over Senator Ted
Cruz's eligibility for president).
286. See Balkin, supra note 9.
287. Id. at 42.
288. See supra notes 270-274 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 270-275 and accompanying text.
290. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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choice of modality is an exercise of conscience that depends on no trans-
modal or metarule.29 1 This assertion is not necessarily incompatible with
this Article's claim. For the claim is not that the Constitution "itself" im-
poses any rule governing how its norms should be interpreted but rather
that within the American constitutional culture, interpreters relate parti-
cular modes of analysis to their understandings of how those norms are
meant to operate. Assessing whether norms count as rules or standards is
internal to the interpreter's modal commitment. The further claim that
this link is consistent across such commitments-i.e., the notion that
even prudentialists or doctrinalists at least implicitly link rules with the
historical modality--does not register within Bobbitt's work.
Fallon's influential work on constitutional pluralism proposes that
different interpretive methods do not tend to diverge, that judges within
the American system tend to argue that all methods lead to the same
happy endings. 292 This tendency reflects not just a desire to avoid cogni-
tive dissonance but also the inherent interdependency of different kinds
of constitutional arguments. 9 If and when judges are unable to achieve
what Fallon calls "constructivist coherence," they adopt a hierarchy of
approaches that does not depend on the kind of question they under-
stand themselves to be answering. That hierarchy begins with text and
"arguments concerning the framers' intent," and it proceeds down to
"constitutional theory, precedent, and moral and policy values." 4 Fallon
offers no account of the origins of this hierarchy or how it might vary
across case type. As with that of other pluralists, Fallon's analysis infers
that whether interpreters are originalist or not depends on extralegal or
idiosyncratic considerations, or else is random.
A final alternative hypothesis is not associated with any extant
theories but is sufficiently plausible to warrant discussion. It may be that
the Court tends to use historical modes of interpretation in cases of first
impression and nonhistorical modes in cases in which stare decisis comes
into play. Because questions governed by constitutional rules are rela-
tively less likely to generate litigation, this Article's identification of rules
with originalism could be missing an important covariance.
A comprehensive test of this alternative hypothesis is beyond the
scope of this Article, which does not mean to exclude other potential
explanations for originalist analysis. It is not the case, however, that the
Court is invariably originalist in cases of first impression. McCulloch is not
best understood in originalist terms, nor is the due process holding in
Dred Scott, and yet both involved constitutional questions of first
impression. The presence of these counterexamples suggests that the
"first impression" theory is at best incomplete. It is also worth noting that
291. See Bobbitt, supra note 17, at 113-14, 125, 155-58.
292. See Fallon, Constructive Coherence Theory, supra note 16, at 1189-94.
293. See id. at 1193.
294. Id. at 1194.
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discovering systematic resort to historical sources in cases of first
impression would be newsworthy and would require the same normative
assessment Part III makes below with respect to rule originalism.
III. THE NORMATIVE CASE
Originalism is subject to frequent and often persuasive criticism.
This Part begins, in section III.A, with three of those criticisms: (1) the
so-called dead hand argument, (2) the bad-consequences argument, and
(3) the relative incompetence of judges to do the necessary historical
work. It explains that each of these applies equally, or even a fortiori, to
rule originalism.
Section III.B then seeks to redeem rule originalism, in part, by
articulating the distinctive benefit of using originalism for constitutional
rules rather than constitutional standards. Specifically, rule originalism is
reflected in positive law, provides relatively transparent criteria for
judgment, and, when used in cases of first impression, is an accepted
means of settling the law in a way that enables settlement and coordin-
ation. This argument for rule originalism is grounded in a teleology of
constitutional rules as distinct from standards. The argument is not
sufficient to make out a prescriptive case for using rule originalism, given
the valid criticisms of section III.A, but it counts as a prima facie reason
to use rule originalism for an interpreter who (like most judges) is com-
mitted to constitutional fidelity as a deontological value.
A. The Case Against Rule Originalism
This section identifies three broad categories of criticism of original-
ism: the dead hand objection, the bad-consequences argument, and the
historical-competence argument. Each of these objections applies equally,
or a fortiori, to rule originalism.
1. The Dead Hand Objection. - The dead hand argument against
originalism is, at bottom, a democratic objection.295 The basic idea is that
the law that governs us should be our law, a set of norms that the
governed consented to or had some role in authoring. The severity of the
objection grows in proportion to our distance from the founding,29 6 and
it is exacerbated by a difficult and practically unavailable amendment
process that is itself susceptible to a dead hand objection. 9 7
295. See Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 Mich. L.
Rev. 165, 192 (2008).
296. Id. at 194 (arguing that the dead hand problem arises as the polity changes
"marginally" over time).
297. See id. at 195-96.
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The dead hand argument is sometimes rendered as an argument
about the illiberal nature of founding-era theories of representation. 298
The fifty-five delegates who gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787 were all white men, and at least fifteen of them, including of course
Washington and Madison, owned slaves. 29 The thousands of participants
at the thirteen state ratifying conventions were chosen under suffrage
rules that generally excluded women, blacks, American Indians, and non-
property-owners. 3 0
This kind of political exclusion speaks to the quality of the
document the drafting and ratification process produced, but it is
tangential to the dead hand argument in its strongest form. Even if the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution had been ideally represent-
ative, the dead hand objection would hold because it is intertemporal in
nature. The problem, according to the dead hand argument, is not that
the framers were white or men but that they are dead, and so is anyone
who had any hand in endowing them with political authority.
Forms of living constitutionalism respond imperfectly to the dead
hand problem. Judicial adherence to current precedents or judicial judg-
ments about modern circumstances represent the modern American
people in only an attenuated way. No one would design a democratic
system that operates through these channels.3°1 Moreover, the dead hand
problem seems to prove too much. It is not just an argument against
originalism but against all of constitutionalism.112 Any rejection of origin-
alism that rests wholly on the dead hand problem must offer a theory of
constitutional fidelity that surmounts or mitigates the objection or else
must reject the Constitution altogether.
Living constitutionalism, even if imperfect, does mitigate the dead
hand objection somewhat. An interpretive method that binds itself fastid-
iously to the founding generation's work doubles down on the problem of
representation. Moreover, the intertemporal problem and the problem of
illiberalism interact more subtly than the above discussion suggests.
Accepting the Constitution as one's own is an act of faith in a political
project."' That faith is strengthened by an understanding of that project
298. See generally Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1987) (recalling founding-era views on slavery and
other sins).
299. Jack N. Rakove, Philadelphia Story, Wilson Q., Spring 1987, at 105, 105.
300. See Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 7, 503-05 n.2 (2005);
Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
64-72 (1913).
301. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J.
1346, 1346-53 (2006) (arguing "judicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a mode of
final decisionmaking in a free and democratic society").
302. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 42; Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead
Hand of the Past, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1127, 1127 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell,
Textualism].
303. See generally Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988).
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as having the capacity to respond to modem problems in a way that is
consistent with modem sensibilities. 3 4 Those sensibilities may have
either a redemptive or a restorative orientation. 30 5 Modern interpreters
expand or contract their visions of the authority of founding-era versus
Reconstruction-era principles in response to these orientations."° A rigid
form of originalism reaffirms the idea of a Constitution that is closed for
business.
The dead hand problem can become downright pathological when
originalism is used to overrule long-settled practices. The democratic
authority of the Constitution is grounded in the people's implicit consent
to the legal and political arrangements it affirms.3 ' A truly settled
practice around which political actors and ordinary Americans have
arranged their activities and projects should be presumed to command
their assent. In light of the intertemporal problem, an undemocratic
actor's decision to overturn such practices based on original under-
standings goes beyond the pedantic and into the realm of the tyrannical.
The dead hand problem applies just as much, and maybe more so,
to rule originalism. °8 Constitutional rules often govern quite important
political arrangements, and original views about their content and requi-
rements have no more democratic purchase than original views about
the content and requirements of constitutional standards. Worse, what
makes constitutional rules distinctive is that they are impervious to new
information. The likelihood of the framers being shortsighted increases
in proportion to the specificity with which they articulate constitutional
norms."° Constitutional actors and subjects may tolerate bad choices the
framers made when the precise meaning of those choices is uncontested,
but rule originalism supposes that interpreters seek to be guided even by
choices whose content is ambiguous. When reasonable people disagree
about the meaning of a constitutional rule, the dead hand objection
seems to counsel a firm thumb on the scale of current practices and
values.
2. Bad Consequences. - A second broad category of objection to
originalism is a concern about the consequences of adhering to the
framers' intentions and understandings.3 10 There are at least two prongs
to the argument from consequences. First, one might worry that the
consequences will be illiberal or anachronistic. Prior generations were
morally regressive, tolerating slavery, dehumanization of women, and
304. See Jamal Greene, Originalism's Race Problem, 88 Denv. U. L. Rev. 517, 521-22
(2011).
305. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 11.
306. See Greene, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 89, at 998-99.
307. See Primus, supra note 295, at 189.
308. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 42.
309. See id.
310. See, e.g., Frederic Bloom & Nelson Tebbe, Countersupermajoritarianism, 113
Mich. L. Rev. 809, 816-19 (2013).
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tribal genocide. Those generations also dealt with governance problems
that were in many ways less complex than what Americans face today,
given the exponentially larger size of the country and the growing
interdependency of its people and institutions. Under the circumstances,
the pragmatic consequence of binding interpretation to original consti-
tutional understandings does not inspire confidence.
Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport disagree."' They
have argued that the primary benefit of relying on original understand-
ings is that, in general, those understandings are the product of
supermajoritarian agreement. 12 There is good reason, they argue, to
expect- relatively good consequences to follow from principles and
policies endorsed by supermajorities. 313 The subsequent views of judges
and ordinary legislative majorities can claim no such mandate.
The most sympathetic form of this argument is as an epistemic
claim. In a world of perfect knowledge, interpreters could assess the
social and political consequences of constitutional construction directly.
In such a world, it is not at all obvious that the best policies would be
those supported by supermajorities. It would depend on who comprised
the supermajorities and what the policies entailed substantively, particu-
larly in respect to the rights of dissenters. In a second-best world of low
information and moral dissensus, however, we might as well go with
supermajoritarian views.
There are several problems with this argument. First, supermajority
requirements have the intertemporal problem discussed above. As a
second best, there are good reasons to support the principles and
policies of modern Americans as opposed to those of ancient ones. Whe-
ther those reasons outweigh the reasons for supporting the policies of
supermajorities over those of ordinary majorities cannot be answered in
the abstract. The difficulty is twofold. First, these kinds of rules of thumb
are incommensurable, and second, even if they were not, comparing
them would depend on the length of time and the size of the super-
majority. The age of the U.S. Constitution and the difficulty of its amend-
ment process do not give one confidence that McGinnis and Rappaport
are right.
Moreover, even in this second-best world, it is true, for sure, that the
supermajorities that ratified much of the Constitution-and especially its
rules-were morally challenged, low-information voters relative to their
posterity. Even in the abstract, there are reasons to significantly discount
their preferences. Finally, McGinnis and Rappaport's argument proves
too much, for it is an argument not just in favor of originalism but
against judicial review. Political actors whose actions are evaluated by
judges applying the Constitution are making competing judgments about
311. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 2.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 12-13.
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what it requires, and their democratic credentials are ordinarily superior
to those ofjudges. 3a1 4
A second and distinct consequentialist concern has to do with
reliance. Wholly apart from whether original understandings were
"good" or "bad" at the time, adhering to founding-era views might upset
reliance interests that current arrangements have generated. The need
to organize around a new equilibrium generates transaction costs that
might outweigh whatever benefit one seeks to gain in honoring original
understandings. This concern does not arise when originalism is coupled
with a robust doctrine of stare decisis or yields to historically validated
practices, but the more it is adulterated in this way the less it is original-
ism, which is the point.
Rule originalism shares and reinforces this consequentialist prob-
lem. As noted, many of the Constitution's rules were enacted in the
eighteenth century by populations that tolerated the intolerable. Not
incidentally, some of the original constitutional rules are bad rules. By my
lights, the Electoral College is one. The Natural Born Citizen Clause is
another. Equal suffrage in the Senate is a third. To the degree thatJustice
Story was correct in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that the Fugitive Slave Clause
authorized slave catcher self-help as a constitutional rule, 15 that was a
bad rule with tragic consequences. Readers will have their own
"favorites."
' 316
3. Historical Competence. - A third objection to originalism is that it
seems to require lawyers and judges to be expert historians. Underlying
this objection are a technical and a related conceptual problem. The
technical problem is that history is a learned discipline whose profes-
sional norms do not align with those of lawyers.3 17 Lawyers and judges are
usually not trained in how to work with primary sources, how to detect
bias, or what modes of evidence count as reliable or sufficient for a given
period. 18 The conceptual problem is the hermeneutic objection to origi-
nalism associated with Professors Paul Brest 9 and Mark Tushnet.
3 20
Deciphering how a multimember body, whether a convention or a citi-
314. See Waldron, supra note 301, at 1361.
315. 41 U.S. 539, 613 (1842).
316. Some of those choices are even collected in an edited volume. Constitutional
Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds.,
1998). The very idea that progressive scholars can produce a volume of this sort (and
likely left much on the cutting room floor) tends to support this Article's positive thesis.
317. See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 625, 639 (2008).
318. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 523, 549-55 (1995).
319. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. Rev. 204, 214-15 (1980).
320. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 796-800 (1983) [hereinafter
Tushnet, Rules Laid Down].
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zenry, intended or expected to apply a constitutional provision requires
aggregation of incommensurable views (or, often, nonviews) and an
imaginative reconstruction of historical context.12' Think of the risk of
microbial contamination that plagues efforts to confirm signs of life on
Mars. 22 Likewise, when we plunge deep into the past, what we inevitably
find there are the parts of ourselves that we took with us.
There are responses to this objection. One is that the historical work
originalist lawyers do is properly different from the work of historians
and should not be judged by historical standards. The lawyer's (or
judge's) question is not about the lessons of history as such but is about
the state of the law at a particular moment in history.323 Legal profes-
sionals may perform this task poorly or well, but there is little question
that it is what they are trained to do when engaged in the workaday tasks
of statutory or contractual interpretation. 32 4 Why should constitutional
law be any different?
Here's why. Constitutional law is almost always public law. The
parties are not just individuals, their modern elected or politically
accountable representatives often have a view about the appropriate
disposition, and constitutional holdings are very difficult to overrule
through democratic means. These differences generate a greater burden
of justification for abiding by one's own contested and law-office-
historical views about original understandings in the face of contrary
laws, executive action, political practice, settled precedent, or intrajudi-
cial dissensus. The democratic process is a competing arbiter of disagree-
ment over matters of public law.325 The judge's technical competence in
ascertaining the law's requirements is one of the things judicial review
has going for it in this competition. It is quite important for this emperor
to have clothes.
Rule originalism as a distinct subspecies does nothing to mitigate the
difficulty of assessing the state of the law in the eighteenth century. There
are, however, arguments that it is nonetheless able to meet its burden of
justification. Section III.B addresses those arguments below.
B. The Case for Rule Originalism
Rule originalism is no more democratic than originalism in general.
There is no special reason to expect that adhering to originalism in cases
321. See Brest, supra note 319, at 217; Tushnet, Rules Laid Down, supra note 320, at 800.
322. See Nat'l Acads. of Scis., Eng'g & Med., Review of the MEPAG Report on Mars
Special Regions 5 (2015) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
323. See Sachs, Originalism as a Theory, supra note 12, at 821-22.
324. See Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (reviewing Michael J. Perry, Morality,
Politics, and Law (1988)); Sachs, Originalism as a Theory, supra note 12, at 887-88.
325. See generally Waldron, supra note 301, at 1350 (discussing the tension between
democratically adopted legislation and antimajoritarianjudicial-review practices).
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implicating the meaning of a constitutional rule is likely to lead to better
outcomes. The opposite expectation might be more appropriate. There
is also little reason to suppose judges are any better historians with
respect to rules than with respect to other constitutional norms.
This section argues that rule originalism nonetheless has distinct
value. First, as Part II seeks to show, rule originalism best describes U.S.
constitutional law. That fact alone counts as a normative argument,
though not a conclusive one, in favor of rule originalism. Second, rule
originalism supplies relatively transparent criteria for answering ques-
tions about the meaning of constitutional rules. The capacity for
originalism to promote judicial restraint is an institutional defense that
has not survived the advent of new originalism. 326 Rule originalism
reinvigorates the institutional argument. Finally, adhering to original
expectations helps to secure the coordination benefits of settled practices
without sacrificing fidelity to constitutional meaning. To the degree that
constitutional fidelity is an important value in itself, rule originalism is
one way to promote it.
1. On "Is" and "Ought. "- In constitutional law, if not in other legal
domains, "is" implies "ought." The basis for constitutional authority is its
implicit acceptance by the American people. As noted above, persistent
and long-standing practices, including judicial practices, should be
presumed to have won that acceptance.3 27 Ajudge's bedrock obligation is
to fit his or her arguments into the established conventions of judicial
practice. If Part II is correct, it would feel off-key for a judge to ignore or
to background original understandings in rules cases or to adopt a
narrow form of originalism in standards cases. Arguably, thatjudge would
be disregarding the law. 328
We can make this argument in somewhat more formal terms. The
notion that "is" does not imply "ought" has sometimes been attributed to
David Hume and is generally used to insist on a distinction between
statements of fact and statements of value, especially in moral dis-
course.329 The idea is that an ethical proposition cannot be derived from
exclusively nonethical premises. 30 One of the ways in which scholars
have tried to defeat this truism is to note that norms of obligation can
enable us to base evaluative judgments upon the existence of certain
kinds of facts. Professor John Searle calls these facts "institutional facts,"
326. See Colby, supra note 13, at 714 (explaining that originalism gained widespread
acceptance in the legal community by abandoning the promise ofjudicial constraint).
327. See McConnell, Textualism, supra note 302, at 1132-33.
328. See Baude, supra note 12, at 2392.
329. See John R. Searle, How to Derive "Ought" From "Is," 73 Phil. Rev. 43, 43 (1964).
The relevant passage from Hume appears in 3 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,
at pt. I, § 1 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 1896) (1739).




for they presuppose "systems of... constitutive rules or conventions." '3 31
Constitutional judging is just such an institution. One can derive the view
that judges ought to behave in a certain way from the fact that the law
comprises that form of behavior.
It is imprudent to dwell long in these fields. While the existence of a
consistent legal practice is one reason for a U.S. judge to behave as if that
practice creates a duty of continuity, it is a weak reason at the U.S.
Supreme Court level, and it does not exhaust the sources ofjudicial duty
at any level.3 3 2 The point is simply that adopting the view that consistent
legal practice gives rise to a judicial duty of continuity entails either a
normative argument in favor of rule originalism or a rejection of the
positive evidence Part II offers.
2. Judicial Restraint. - Originalism was once defended primarily on
its capacity to restrain judges.3 3 The basic idea is that judges who are
otherwise without criteria for deciding how to apply many of the
Constitution's more abstract clauses could discipline their judgments by
appealing to a set of relatively transparent professional norms.3 3 4 Judges
who instead exercise their own moral judgments about the meaning of
terms like "equal" and "due" and "cruel" run more directly into the
teeth of the countermajoritarian difficulty.
This argument for originalism focuses on standards rather than
rules, since standards are precisely the norms that tempt judges to vague
decisional criteria. The problem, though, is that the Constitution has lots
of standards, and constitutional fidelity seems to require judges to take
stock of them. 35 Judges have a duty to obey the law, even if the law
requires the exercise ofjudgment. Forms of new originalism that tend to
focus on the original meaning of the words rather than the specific
expectations of the framers or the ratifying generation have back-
grounded or rejected entirely the idea ofjudicial restraint as a maxim or
even a desideratum of a theory of constitutional interpretation.33 6
To the extent that the capacity for judicial restraint is an attractive
feature of an interpretive method, rule originalism is one response. Since
331. Searle, supra note 329, at 55.
332. See John Finnis, On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1597, 1603 (2000).
333. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 599, 602
(2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism].
334. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
Ind. L.J. 1, 10 (1971).
335. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 24 (noting constitutional drafters "use standards or
principles because they want to channel politics but delegate the details to future
generations"); Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 10, at 487 (noting that the Constitution "is
infused with standards to a degree that often escapes notice").
336. See Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 333, at 608-09; see also Randy E.




rule originalism is attentive to the different kinds of norms within the
Constitution, it is not susceptible to a criticism that it elevates judicial
restraint above the text. Of course, since the rule-standard dichotomy is
at least to some degree constructed by the interpreter, the capacity of
rule originalism to constrain is intelligible only in relative terms. This
capacity depends on the benefits of methodological transparency.
Sunshine may disinfect constitutional reasons no better than it disinfects
wounds; still, ceteris paribus, one can expect self-consciously narrow
examinations of constitutional meaning to offer greater prospects for
constraint than self-consciously broad ones.
As practiced in courts, rule originalism may yet be susceptible to a
different criticism that new originalism aims to surmount-namely that it
is not grounded in a persuasive theory of authority. As this Article has
described it, rule originalism has tended to focus on original intentions
and expectations rather than original meaning per se. Even apart from
the dead hand objection already discussed, it is difficult to say why, in
theory, anyone's subjective beliefs and expectations as to the law's content
should bind future generations or even contemporaneous Americans. 7
One answer to this objection would be to limit rule originalism to original-
meaning originalism, which would be contrary to historical practice. This
Article provides another answer. It concedes the point and seeks to justify
rule originalism on the basis of that practice, its institutional advantages,
and the teleological justifications discussed below.
3. A Teleology of Rules. - Rules have purposes. More precisely, legal
drafters who enact rules do so for particular reasons. Rules are typically
designed to promote certainty and predictability. Raz writes, "Since the
law should strive to balance certainty and reliability against flexibility, it is
on the whole wise legal policy to use rules as much as possible for
regulating human behavior because they are more certain than principles
and lend themselves more easily to uniform and predictable applica-
tion.""' When the values of stability and predictability outweigh the values
of flexibility and practicality, drafters incline toward rules.33 9 When the
weight of values is reversed, drafters incline toward standards.' Whether
or not those reasons in fact motivated any particular drafters, it is
reasonable to ascribe those reasons to them in the course of constitu-
tional interpretation and construction. 341
A constitution has good reasons for codifying both relatively rigid
rules and relatively fluid standards. Because the application of rules is
337. But see Jed Rubenfeld, Revolution by Judiciary: The Structure of American
Constitutional Law 12-18 (2005) (arguing that intentions embodied in "paradigm cases"
reflect commitments that bind future generations).
338. Raz, supra note 22, at 841.
339. See Schlag, supra note 51, at 400.
340. See id.
341. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 10, at 503.
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predictable, rules enable political actors and ordinary citizens to coordi-
nate their behavior on the basis of a shared set of assumptions. For this
reason, rules are ordinarily (though not solely) associated with govern-
mental structure. Professor Michael McConnell compares constitutional
rules to the rules of basketball: "If the rules were constantly up for grabs,"
he writes, "players would be forced to spend their time in rulemaking
rather than in playing basketball. '34 2 Standards instead reflect both
humility and wisdom. The future application of constitutional norms in
the face of changing factual contexts, technologies, and values is un-
known and may call for different judgments than the ones that suit the
present generation.
These purposes carry implications for constitutional interpretation.
Fidelity to the teleology of constitutional rules suggests an interpretive
inquiry whose sources do not change over time.3 43 The fact that a rule is
at issue tells us to expect political practice, social evolution, or technol-
ogical change subsequent to enactment to have limited epistemic value.
For rules, the value of settlement overwhelms the informational value of
subsequent practice, and so the mode of interpretation should also
privilege predictability. Here is Raz again: "Since in the use of rules the
premium should be on certainty, whereas in the use of principles the
premium is on flexibility, it is wise to accept relatively simple methods of
resolving conflicts between rules which will not detract from the
predictability of their application. '
In parallel, fidelity to the choice of constitutional standards suggests
an ecumenical interpretive inquiry, one that is open to new and evolving
sources of wisdom and authority. The decision to employ a standard is a
decision to give significant discretion to downstream actors and inter-
preters in order "to meet changes in circumstance and opinion. 'M 5 For
standards, subsequent information in the form of developing conven-
tions, shifting values, and new data goes directly to the substance of the
constitutional norm. For rules, by contrast, such information may tell us
whether the rule is a good one or a bad one, should be adhered to or
not, but it does not tell us about the rule's content or requirements.
Fidelity to a constitutional standard requires us to incorporate new
information into the decisional process. Fidelity to a constitutional rule
requires us not to do so.
I suspect that some instinct toward fidelity attracts judges to rule
originalism. Still, these functionalist claims do not make out a complete
argument in its favor, even laying to one side the objections section III.A
342. McConnell, Textualism, supra note 302, at 1130.
343. Of course, the conclusions one draws from originalist sources can change, but
surely one can expect greater settlement when only interpretations change rather than
when both interpretation and what is being interpreted change.
344. Raz, supra note 22, at 842.
345. Id. at 847.
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catalogs. Rather, they argue only in favor of an interpretive strategy that
is stable and is attentive to prevailing practices. As McConnell writes,
being guided by the teleology of rules "implies a form of constitutional
interpretation in which it matters more that issues be decided in a stable,
consistent, and predictable fashion than that they be decided in
accordance with any particular methodology.""4 For McConnell, that
means "a strong doctrine of stare decisis" and a commitment to judicial
supremacy.347 Indeed, the prevailing interpretive approach of the High
Court of Australia, which Australians call "legalism," marries originalism
with a commitment to stare decisis precisely to promote the value of
stability that the rule of law should, in the High Court's view, support.3 48
Importantly, Australia has no federal bill of rights, and so the High Court
rarely entertains individual rights questions. When the primary purpose
of constitutional norms is to establish a governmental architecture and
enable intergovernmental coordination, predictability is especially
valuable.
For this reason, the teleological justification for rule originalism
cannot be indifferent to the degree to which subsequent historical
practice has wholly or partly settled an issue. Using rule originalism to
upset practices around which government and the people have
organized their affairs is in tension with the purpose of adopting
constitutional rules. Rules reflect ajudgment that the value of settlement
outweighs the incremental value of learning about best practices. A
corollary is that the cost of unsettling a stable but unfaithful equilibrium
may outweigh the value of honoring the rule's substantive content.
There are interpretive strategies other than originalism or stare
decisis that may yield a parallel degree of settlement. For example, one
could interpret constitutional rules according to one's best assessment of
what Rawls (or Nozick, if you prefer3 49 ) would have decided. This strategy
would raise a very serious "fit" problem."' Rule originalism has the
benefit of strong sociological legitimacy, though it is important to note,
again, that this justification does not recommend any particular form of
originalism. Indeed, the historical absence of any distinction between
346. McConnell, Textualism, supra note 302, at 1130.
347. Id.
348. See Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 17 (Austl.) (Barwick, CJ)
("The only true guide and the only course which can produce stability in constitutional law is
to read the language of the Constitution itself... and to find its meaning in legal
reasoning."); Tony Blackshield & George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and
Theory 322 (3d ed. 2002); see also Owen Dixon, Swearing In of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief
Justice (Apr. 12, 1952), in (1952) 85 CLR xi, xiv (Austl.) ("There is no other safe guide to
judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and complete legalism.").
349. Cf. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 58 (1980) ("We like Rawls, you like
Nozick. We win 6-3. Statute invalidated.").
350. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 1, at 1058-60.
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different forms of originalism in the practice of constitutional adjudica-
tion tends to buttress this Article's thesis.
This section has offered a set of normative arguments that supports
the positive practice of rule originalism. It is important to reiterate that
these arguments are not prescriptive. They provide a set of justifications
for rule originalism, but those justifications are not conclusive in light of
the dead hand, consequentialist, and competence arguments outlined in
section III.A. The next Part takes up the question of what follows from a
justification for rule originalism grounded in the teleological arguments
discussed above.
IV. RULE ORIGINALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
One of the examples offered in section II.B to make out the positive
case for rule originalism was an Arizona case in which the state legisla-
ture challenged a constitutional amendment that gave an independent
commission the power to draw congressional district lines. 35' As discus-
sed, the merits argument concerned the meaning of a constitutional
rule-the import of the word "legislature" in the Elections Clause-and
the Court's methodology was originalist.
There was an additional threshold question in the AIRC decision
that helps model the problem this part addresses. The question was
whether the Arizona legislature had standing to litigate the case. The
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission argued that the state
legislature did not have standing to challenge legislative maps unless and
until the legislature could identify a specific legislative act that the ballot
initiative establishing the independent commission forestalled." 2 The
United States as amicus curiae argued that the state legislature would
need to pass a competing districting plan and have the secretary of state
reject that plan.353 The Court rejected these arguments, holding that the
legislature's standing was based on the fact that the Arizona Constitution
made the Commission's redistricting plan conclusive . 4
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented and also argued
that the legislature lacked standing. 55 Based on his view of the original
understanding of what constituted cases or controversies under Article
351. AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658-59 (2015).
352. Id. at 2663.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 2665.
355. Id. at 2694 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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III, Section 2,356 Justice Scalia argued that disputes between govern-
mental institutions over the allocation of political power do not qualify.3
57
For Justice Scalia, the constitutional standing requirements were a device
for maintaining the separation of powers.3 58 Complaints by a government
subunit, he wrote, should be resolved "in the context of a private lawsuit
in which the claim or defense depends on the constitutional validity of
action by one of the governmental subunits that has caused a private
party concrete harm."3 59 Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion includes a list
of cases that, it maintains, could have been decided much earlier had the
Court permitted institutional standing for governmental actors to resolve
separation of powers conflicts: 360 Myers v. United States, involving the
constitutionality of limits on presidential removal of executive officials;
36
'
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, on Congress's power to override the President's
decision to list Jerusalem rather than Israel as the place of birth of
passport holders born in the city;362 Wellness International Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif on whether bankruptcy courts have the constitutional authority to
adjudicate state law counterclaims; 63 and NLRB v. Noel Canning, the
Recess Appointments Clause case discussed in section II.B. 6"
This Article illuminates why Justice Scalia's perspective on insti-
tutional standing, though well-pedigreed, was problematic and even
perverse. It also helps us to formulate rational distinctions between the
cases the opinion mentions, thereby arresting the parade of horribles.
Let's play out what could follow from a holding that the Arizona
legislature did not have standing in AIRC. The Commission's con-
gressional redistricting plan would stand. Individual plaintiffs-whether
political parties, associations representing minorities, or perhaps ordi-
nary voters who were not placed in their preferred districts' 5-might still
be able to sue on the ground that any map created by the Commission is
invalid. In the nature of individual litigation, though, one cannot say
whether they would sue. After all, the Republican-controlled Arizona
state legislature did not challenge the Commission's first redistricting
plan, the one that followed the 2000 census, presumably because
Republicans took six of Arizona's eight congressional seats in the 2002
356. Notably, Justice Scalia appears to have understood this requirement as stating a
rule rather than a standard. See id. at 2695.
357. See id. at 2694.
358. See id. at 2695 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
362. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
363. 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
364. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014); see supra section II.B.
365. Individual voters challenged the Commission's state map on equal protection
grounds in a case that reached the Supreme Court. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm'n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1305 (2016).
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election.166 (Republicans took just four of the state's nine seats in the
2012 election that preceded the lawsuit.)3 6 7 And so someone might sue,
or might not. Another election might pass, or two, or three. Eventually,
someone would sue and the state would face the prospect of its
Commission's work being declared void ab initio.3 8 Anyone elected
under a map drawn by the Commission, presumably since 2000, could,
on this hypothetical, be in danger of being declared improperly elected.
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that a reviewing court would
consider the established practices of the Commission since 2000 to be
relevant both to the merits and to the remedy in a case raising this
question. Notice, however, that before Justice Scalia's death, he and
Justice Thomas were the two justices least likely to find those established
practices relevant. Justice Scalia wrote pejoratively in Noel Canning that
relying on long-standing executive practice rather than strictly adhering
to the original meaning of the text resembles "an adverse-possession
theory of executive authority." '69 Putting these views together, Justice
Scalia was advocating a regime in which the Court refuses to intervene
on the request of the Arizona state legislature or, in Noel Canning, the
Senate, but instead waits an indefinite length of time-more than 200
years in the case of Noel Canning-so that, a political practice having
developed, the Court can disregard that practice and return to the
original understanding. All in the name of separation of powers! Scalia's
blunt version of originalism created the very absurdity he protested.
There are three sources of difficulty that must be resolved in
harmony to prevent the kind of result Justice Scalia advocated in AIRC
and Noel Canning. The first is the Supreme Court's traditional reluctance
to grant institutional standing. Justice Scalia was correct that doing so is
rare. 70 The second is the passage of time. When there is a long gap
between the commencement of an act and the Court's resolution of a
constitutional challenge to it, strong reliance interests can rightfully tilt
the Court's judgment in favor of the status quo. This tendency might be
especially strong, again rightfully, when the judgment was made by
politically accountable government actors who were elected and acted
under prevailing assumptions about the scope of their power. The third
source of difficulty is the Court's interpretive method. The choice
between approaches that draw upon the lessons of social and political
366. See Howard Fischer, Republicans File New Challenge to Congressional District




368. In AIRC, the Arizona State Legislature requested only prospective invalidation.
See AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658-59 (2015). But there is no telling what relief a future liti-
gant would request or receive.
369. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
370. See AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2695-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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practice and those that do not is a consequential one in this context.
Faced with these sources of difficulty, Justice Scalia resolved the problem
in the most disharmonious possible way: Refuse institutional standing,
ignore the passage of time, and adopt originalism. His jurisprudential
ideology appears to have committed him to this position.
Rule originalism urges more nuance. For the rule originalist,
whether to adopt a static approach to interpretation depends in the first
instance on whether the question at issue is about the meaning of a rule
or the application of a standard. Recall that the strongest justification for
rule originalism is teleological: Originalism about rules and nonoriginal-
ism about standards match the respective reasons for adopting rules and
standards. On this justification, the question of whether to grant insti-
tutional standing also should depend, at least in part, on whether the
interpreter is facing a rule question or a standard question. Denying
institutional standing invites the political branches to work through the
problem over time, while allowing such standing pretermits that political
negotiation. Accordingly, such standing should be more freely available
in cases about the meaning of constitutional rules. Subsequent political
practices have epistemic value in understanding the substance of con-
stitutional standards but have little (or at least diminishing) epistemic
value in understanding the substance of constitutional rules. As noted,
however, this justification should not treat long-standing practices with
indifference. Once a practice is firmly embedded within the legal system,
rule originalism should permit the practice to mitigate the interpreter's
instinct toward original understandings.
We now have some new tools to bring to AIRC and the cases Justice
Scalia discussed in his dissent. As noted, AIRC involved a rule question,
and the Court granted institutional standing. Refusing to do so would
have invited the perverse outcome discussed above. Noel Canning
involved a rule question, and the Court has never faced the question of
Senate standing to resolve the meaning of the Recess Appointments
Clause. As Justice Scalia's AIRC dissent implies, the Court likely would
have rejected Senate standing, as it would have been unprecedented. But
the central problem in Noel Canning-what to do with a long-standing
practice that appears to be inconsistent with original understandings but
is more consistent with modern technology and expectations-would
have been substantially mitigated had the Senate been able to litigate the
case in the nineteenth century.
371
Rule originalism less clearly counsels relaxation of standing require-
ments in a case like Myers.3 2 It is possible, as noted, to characterize the
371. See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 Harv. L.
Rev. 124, 127 (2014) (arguing that "Noel Canning is as much about when the Court should
engage interpretative questions as it is about how it should do so").
372. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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President's exclusive removal power as an atextual rule,373 but it is also
possible to regard it as an application of "the executive Power, ' 374 a
constitutional standard. Neither characterization is either obvious or
uniquely correct. We should accordingly expect contestation over which
is more faithful to the constitutional design. The exclusive power of
removal is not subject to incremental qualification, but the "executive-
ness" of an exercise of presidential power is a matter of degree. Notice
that when the Court limited the Myers holding to "purely" executive
officers less than a decade after Myers, its opinion was conspicuously
nonoriginalist. 7
5
Zivotofsky involved a question about the foreign affairs power, and
the Article III exclusivity issue in Wellness International Network is an
interpretation of "the judicial power." Both powers are readily charac-
terized as involving constitutional standards. The precise degree to which
the foreign affairs power is subject to congressional limitation or amend-
ment and the kinds of claims administrative courts-unknown at the
founding-have the power to adjudicate are questions that become
easier rather than harder to answer on contact with subsequent political
and social practices. Those practices have epistemic rather than simply
practical value. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Zivotofsky pays far
more heed to precedent, to prudential concerns, and to international
law than to original understandings. 76 Justice Sotomayor's analysis in
Wellness International Network is entirely doctrinal.3 7
This section has focused on government institutional standing, but
the justification for rule originalism might suggest relaxation of the rules
of individual standing as well. After all, if there are good teleological
reasons to adjudicate rules questions relatively early, then why should
those reasons be limited to intergovernmental litigation? This point has
some force but is less consequential than the point about institutional
standing. First, constitutional rules typically (though not always) 37 emerge
from structural provisions that regulate the relationship between govern-
mental institutions. Second, a special pathology afflicts the Court's
treatment of institutional standing. It denies such standing even in the
presence of a strong institutional interest, such as the Senate's interest in
373. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting there may be constitutional
rules not memorialized within the constitutional text).
374. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 10, at 499 (noting
though the "rules/standards spectrum is a spectrum," the Article II Vesting Clause "has
important standard-like features").
375. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 603 (1935); see also Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 30, at 851-52 (lauding the originalism of Myers
and lamenting the nonoriginalism of Humphrey's Executor).
376. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-94 (2015).
377. See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942 (2015) ("Our
precedents make clear that litigants may validly consent to adjudication by bankruptcy
courts.").
378. See supra section II.B.
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presidential appointments that skirt advice and consent, or the interest
of members of Congress in the President's line-item vetoes,3 79 or the
Attorney General's interest in the threat of a one-house veto of his
decision to suspend deportationY.8 0 This Article urges that, in cases about
the meaning of constitutional rules, the Court should have no special
aversion to the standing of political actors or institutions. The very
separation of powers objections that the Court relies on in denying stand-
ing in such cases resurface when the Court is later tempted to ignore the
reigning political equilibrium in deference to original understandings.
There is another way out that bears mention. The decision to refuse
institutional standing in a case in which institutional interests are plainly
at issue invites the conclusion that the case presents a political question.
While in theory questions of standing are jurisdictional matters distinct
from the prudential question of whether to decline jurisdiction on
political question grounds, the doctrines are deeply intertwined. The
constitutional commitment of a question to the political branches, the
lack of manageable judicial standards, and other indicia of a nonjust-
iciable political question 38 ' reflect a separation of powers instinct that
dovetails with the Court's general resistance to intergovernmental stan-
ding. For anyone squeamish about relaxing such standing, the problem
of conflict between certain long-standing political practices and original
understandings may instead be resolved by declaring a political question
and being done with it.38 2
There is much to like about this solution. The problem with denying
standing is that doing so delays adjudication but does not prevent it,
thereby engineering a potential conflict between practice and constitu-
tional rules. A political question judgment forecloses judicial resolution
altogether. Relaxed institutional standing and rigid enforcement of the
political question doctrine are compatible in theory. The Court has never
suggested that whether a case raises a political question depends on when
it is adjudicated (though it is not difficult to imagine instances in which
that judgment would be plausible). In practice, however, one attracted to
a robust political question doctrine would have good reason to be
skeptical of relaxed governmental standing. Inviting courts to resolve
intergovernmental conflicts sooner rather than later is likely to affect
their assessment of which controversies are truly outside their com-
petence. Standing determinations are hardly immune to motivated rea-
379. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813-14 (1997).
380. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 922 (1983).
381. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing common case characteristics
that give rise to a political question).
382. An amicus brief in Noel Canning urged just this resolution. See Amicus Curiae
Brief of Professor Victor Williams in Support of Petitioner and Urging Reversal at 10,
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (No. 12-1281), 2013 WL 5323363.
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soning.383 Rule originalism is, in this sense, a conservative doctrine with
activist implications.
One senses in modern U.S. politics a none-too-subtle judicialization
of political conflict that unsettles the assumptions of the Hart-and-Sacks
legal order. A brief examination of three recent exemplars of that
disquieting trend helps to synthesize this Article's core claims. That
examination begins with an Appropriations Clause challenge to the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), followed by state
challenges to the Obama Administration's executive action on immi-
gration, before concluding with a brief discussion of potential litigation
over Senator Ted Cruz's eligibility to be President under the Natural
Born Citizen Clause.
In September 2015, a district judge in Washington, D.C., held that
the House of Representatives had standing to complain that the federal
government unconstitutionally spent money on sections of the ACA
without a congressional appropriation. 38 4 Whatever one thinks of the
House's claim that it has suffered an institutional injury in this case, this
Article does not suggest that standing should be liberalized. It is possible
to imagine an Appropriations Clause claim that constitutes a dispute over
the meaning of a rule-for example, what is "Money"?-but this case
does not involve such a claim. The legal dispute in the case is an inter-
pretive disagreement over whether the ACA authorizes the President to
draw upon a permanent appropriation or instead requires temporary
appropriations 5.3 8 It is true that if the House succeeds on its merits claim,
as the district court must assume in adjudicating a standing argument,
the President has violated the Appropriations Clause. But that condi-
tional conclusion is not in dispute, and so the case is not about the
meaning of a constitutional rule. What is in dispute is the meaning of a
federal statute. It is not surprising, then, that the court's merits opinion
contained no discussion of the original meaning of the Appropriations
Clause. 3 6
Last term, the Supreme Court heard argument on a challenge by
twenty-six states to the Obama Administration's decision to defer immi-
gration enforcement and grant work authorization to a class of undocu-
mented immigrants." 7 The Fifth Circuit and the district court both held
that individual states had standing and ruled against the Administration
383. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 Tex. L. Rev.
1061, 1098-99 (2015).
384. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law ... ."); U.S. House of Representatives v.
Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 76-77 (D.D.C. 2015).
385. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2016 WL
2750934, at *7 (D.D.C. May 12, 2016).
386. See id.
387. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2271 (2016) (mem.).
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on the merits8s The Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit by
a 4-4 split, with no opinion." 9 The constitutional question in the case was
whether the exercise of enforcement discretion violates the President's
obligations under the Take Care Clause,390 a classic constitutional stan-
dard. Should a future Court reach the merits on the constitutional
question, its analysis will likely focus intently on the historical, post-
ratification relations between Congress and the President and on prior
political and legal precedent. Original understanding will be of limited
relevance, and this Article provides no special reason for leniency in
considering whether a state has standing.
Finally, there was much discussion during the 2016 presidential
primary season of Senator Cruz's constitutional eligibility for the
presidency.3 91 Cruz was born in Canada to a U.S. citizen mother and a
noncitizen father.39 2 Under the nationality law in place at the time of his
birth, Cruz was born a citizen. The interpretive question subject to public
debate was whether the Constitution's requirement that the president be
a "natural born Citizen"3 93 requires him or her to have been born in the
United States or its territories. Unlike the Appropriations Clause and
deferred action questions, the question of whether an American born
abroad under a statutory grant of citizenship at birth is eligible to be
president is a classic constitutional-rule question. One would predict
debate over this question to focus heavily on original understandings,
and indeed it has.39 4
For a rule originalist, this conclusion carries implications for
standing. On the mighty assumption that a court believes the case to be
justiciable, 93 rule originalism recommends a relatively liberal approach
388. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); Texas v. United States, 86 E Supp. 3d 591,
677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), affd, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015).
389. Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2271.
390. Id.
391. See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, Lawsuit Questions Ted Cruz's Eligibility to Be
President, N.Y. Times: First Draft (Jan. 15, 2016, 1:41 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/
politics/first-draft/2016/01/15/lawsuit-questions-ted-cruzs-eligibiity-to-be-president/ (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
392. Deroy Murdock, Will Ted Cruz's Canadian Birth Prove to Be a Liability in a
General Election?, Nat'l Rev. (Feb. 19, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/431552/ted-cruzs-natural-born-citizen-canadian-birth-problem (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
393. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
394. See, e.g., supra note 3 (referring to sources that seek to resolve the question of
Senator Cruz's eligibility through historical inquiry).
395. See Akhil Reed Amar, Opinion, Why Ted Cruz Is Eligible to Be President, CNN
(Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/13/opinions/amar-cruz-trump-natural-born-
citizen [http://perma.cc/49R6-VALL] (arguing that the American people should conclu-
sively adjudicate this kind of question at the ballot box). The Cruz case provides a potential
example of a situation in which the political question determination turns on the timing
and posture of litigation. The case for the political question doctrine seems stronger were
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to standing. If Cruz's eligibility is susceptible to resolution by courts,
there are very good reasons to resolve it before he becomes President
rather than have it linger indefinitely during a Cruz presidency. Cruz
becoming President would provide a compelling pragmatic reason to
ignore eighteenth-century evidence suggesting his lack of qualification-
presidency by adverse possession, so to speak-but it would not help a
judge understand the meaning of the rule embodied within the Natural
Born Citizen Clause.
CONCLUSION
One of Professor Alexander Bickel's most memorable observations
was that an apex court should tailor its docket to its mode of inquiry. For
Bickel, this meant that a court committed to deciding cases according to
principle rather than expediency had to limit its merits decisions in a way
that made that high-minded approach possible. 96 As Professor Gerald
Gunther archly observed, Bickel's novelty was "100% insistence on
principle, 20% of the time. 39
7
This Article also has argued that a court's approach to constitutional
implementation relates to its docket in surprising ways, but it turns Bickel
on his head. Constitutional interpretation in the United States obeys
what this Article has called rule originalism. Interpreters tend to pursue
originalist methods, narrowly conceived, when they face questions about
the meaning of constitutional rules, and they tend to pursue nonori-
ginalist methods when they face questions about the application of
constitutional standards. The instinct toward rule originalism operates
across substance and across judicial ideology. It will usually result in
nonoriginalist analysis, but this will not always be so, and it will not be so
even in some hard cases. In a sense, the present constitutional culture
maintains a twenty-percent insistence on originalism, one hundred per-
cent of the time.
This division is best justified on teleological grounds: A static
interpretive mode respects the settlement and coordination function of
rules, which will often operate to set out the division of powers between
government actors. But if originalism is appropriate for constitutional
rules, and if the reason it is appropriate for constitutional rules is
because it promotes constitutional settlement, some further implications
for separation of powers might follow. Specifically, it might follow that
courts should more liberally permit government institutional standing to
more expeditiously resolve disputes over constitutional rules, lest the
Cruz to have won a presidential election than it would if a state were, for example, to leave
Cruz off a primary ballot based on its view that he was not eligible to be president.
396. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 68-71 (1962).
397. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1964).
2016] 1703
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
executive bias that hangs over historical practice distort constitutional
meaning without contributing much epistemic value. 398 This conclusion
suggests, paradoxically, that the best reasons for originalism draw on
originalism's capacity for judicial constraint and yet support a functional
enlargement ofjudicial authority.
398. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 27, at 440-47 (explaining why Congress has
limited ability to check growing executive power).
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